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SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND THE LIMITS OF
ENCRYPTED INTERPRETATIONS
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
SHAREHOLDERS have the right under Rule 14a-81 to include propos-als in a company’s proxy statement.2  Almost always precatory,3 propos-
als advise rather than command.4  The provision provides a mechanism
for obtaining the collective views of shareholders.5  Typically opposed by
management, proposals generally engender discussions on matters that
companies would prefer to avoid.6  Moreover, although advisory, propos-
als can impose meaningful constraints on managerial discretion.
* Board Member, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.  The views
expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the PCAOB, the other members of the Board, or the Board’s staff.  The
PCAOB makes no representation as to the accuracy or completeness of this
information.  The Article was written and accepted for publication prior to the
author joining the PCAOB.  At that time, the author was the Lawrence W. Treece
Professor of Corporate Governance and the Director, Corporate & Commercial
Law Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  Thanks to Bernard
Sharfman for reading a draft and providing comments.  The views and errors,
however, belong exclusively to the author.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017).
2. The right is limited to companies subject to the proxy rules.  The proxy
rules apply to issuers that have registered a class of shares with the Securities and
Exchange Commission under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012).
3. See Catherine G. Dearlove & A. Jacob Werrett, Proxy Access by Private Order-
ing: A Review of the 2012 and 2013 Proxy Seasons, 69 BUS. L. 155, 165 (2013) (“Most
of the [shareholder access] proposals submitted in 2012 were precatory, including
the two proposals that were ultimately successful.”).
4. See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of
Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 273 (2016) (“Importantly, most shareholder pro-
posals—and virtually all social and environmental proposals—are precatory, which
means that they are recommendations and are not binding on management.”).
5. The costs are largely born by the issuer. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revital-
izing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanage-
ment by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 708–09 (2016) (“Absent Rule 14a-8,
there would be no vehicle for shareholders to put proposals on the issuer’s proxy
statement . . . . From the proponent’s prospective, the chief advantage of the
Shareholder Proposal Rule is that it is inexpensive.”).
6. Management can include a statement of opposition. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(m).  For a discussion of this requirement, see generally Alex Hinz, Is-
suer Opposition and Shareholder Disagreement: Rule 14a-8(m), 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE
223 (2016).  In a few instances, management has supported a proposal.  A propo-
sal at Layne Christensen received over 90% where the board recommended adop-
tion. See, e.g., Layne Christensen Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) 3 (June 9, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/888504/000115752311003631/a6758
154.htm [https://perma.cc/UK26-EY2R] (“Stockholder proposal regarding the
(35)
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An often contentious provision,7 the rule has over time been subject
to significant modification.8  What started as a lithe provision of 215 words
eventually morphed into a behemoth ten times as long, with much of the
additional verbiage consisting of procedural hurdles and substantive ex-
clusions.9  Not all of the limitations, however, were included in the text.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) added
an interpretive gloss to the rule.  In some cases, the guidance defined
terms or provided insight on existing elements.  In other instances, the
interpretations substantively altered the meaning of the rule.
The administrative positions were often encrypted.  Encryption en-
tailed the use of interpretations known within the agency but not other-
wise disclosed publicly.  The positions instead became apparent through
application.
Informal advice with respect to Rule 14a-8 appeared in “no-action”
letters.10  The missives, at least since the 1990s, generally contained no
meaningful analysis but merely agreed or disagreed with a company’s posi-
tion.  Only with repeated application to a variety of fact patterns did inter-
pretive positions become known.  Even then, the boundaries often
preparation of a sustainability report”; received “For: 14,873,784”; “Against:
1,147,321”; “Abstains: 1,611,235”).  Management recommended approval of the
proposal. See Layne Christensen Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 33 (May
10, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/888504/00011575231100
2976/a6710913.htm [https://perma.cc/QUW7-2PTD].
7. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH COMM’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISCLOSURE
SIMPLIFICATION 80 (1996), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbb
fd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1990/1996_0305_TF_Disc
Simpl.pdf [https://perma.cc/99CU-V6C5] (“Few areas of the federal securities
laws have been as contentious as shareholder proposals under Exchange Act Rule
14a-8.”).
8. Calls continue to arise for restrictions on the use of the rule, particularly
through a dramatic increase in the eligibility thresholds. See Letter from Mark J.
Costa, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Eastman Chem. Co., Smart Regulation
Comm. Bus. Roundtable, to Gary D. Cohn, Dir., Nat’l Econ. Council 3 (Feb. 22,
2017), https://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Regulations%20of%20
Concern%20Letter%20and%20List%20170222.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF63-
FNMC] (“In too many cases, activist investors with insignificant stakes in public
companies make shareholder proposals that pursue social or political agendas un-
related to the interests of the shareholders as a whole.  BRT released specific rec-
ommendations on ways to reform the shareholder proposal process to tighten
eligibility and enable more exclusions of proposals and repeat submissions.  BRT
can accomplish most of its goals through SEC rulemaking, interpretation and gui-
dance but pressure from Congress, including potential legislative action would en-
courage the SEC to move forward.”).
9. See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Evolving Role of Rule 14a-8 in the Corpo-
rate Governance Process, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 151 (2016) [hereinafter Brown,
Evolving Role].
10. For a discussion of the no-action letter process, see Donna M. Nagy, Judi-
cial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and
a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 936–43 (1998); see also Thomas P.
Lemke, The SEC No–Action Letter Process, 42 BUS. L. 1019, 1028 (1987).
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remained unclear and were subject to abrupt shifts in scope and
meaning.11
The reliance on, and consequences of, encrypted interpretations can
be seen in connection with the use of subsection (i)(3) of Rule 14a-8.12
Added in 1976,13 the provision allowed companies to eliminate proposals
and supporting statements deemed false and misleading.  Taking on a
much broader purpose than contemplated by the rule, the provision was
quickly deployed as an editing tool.
The exclusion targeted submissions that were poorly written or con-
tentious.14  Statements did not have to be false but could be excluded to
the extent deemed confusing, irrelevant, or vague.  The Commission bal-
anced the broad interpretation with a liberal right to cure.  Shareholders
often received the ability to revise language identified as problematic.15
Neither the editing function nor the right to cure appeared in the
rule.  Instead, they became apparent only through application.  Moreover,
with the boundaries unclear, interpretations shifted over time.  The uncer-
tainty meant that issuers could challenge almost any proposal as mislead-
ing. As a result, by the new millennium, the exclusion became the most
widely used basis for seeking the omission of a proposal.16
The tax on administrative resources resulting from the approach ulti-
mately induced a shift in interpretation.17  To reduce the number of con-
tested proposals, the scope of the exclusion was narrowed.18  In particular,
11. For a further discussion of these abrupt shifts, see infra note 197.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2017).
13. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Ex-
change Act Release No. 12,999, 1976 WL 160347, at *18 (Nov. 22, 1976).
14. For a further discussion of the exclusion’s effect, see infra Section II.
15. The right did not apply to proposals requiring “detailed and extensive
editing.” See Div. of Corp. Fin., Shareholder Proposals, SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No.
14, 20 (July 13, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm [https://
perma.cc/8GKV-2AYP] (“[W]hen a proposal and supporting statement will re-
quire detailed and extensive editing in order to bring them into compliance with
the proxy rules, we may find it appropriate for companies to exclude the entire
proposal, supporting statement, or both, as materially false or misleading.”).
16. See app. A.
17. See Div. of Corp. Fin., Shareholder Proposals, SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No.
14B (Sept. 15, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14b.htm [https://
perma.cc/UKX5-NL6V] (essentially reversing longstanding interpretive positions
under subsection (i)(3) of Rule 14a-8).
18. The bulletin acknowledged that the prior interpretation had not been an
“appropriate” extension of the exclusion. See id. (“We believe that the staff’s pro-
cess of becoming involved in evaluating wording changes to proposals and/or sup-
porting statements has evolved well beyond its original intent and resulted in an
inappropriate extension of rule 14a-8(i)(3).”).  The reference to “staff” through-
out the Article generally means the staff of the Division of Corporation-Finance,
the Division within the Commission responsible for administering and interpret-
ing Rule 14a-8. See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHARE-
HOLDER PROPOSALS (Nov. 2, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8-informal-procedures.htm [https://perma.cc/7W4W-PFES].
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issuers seeking exclusion as false and misleading had to present objective
evidence of falsity.19
The shift in interpretation was not encrypted but publicly announced
in a SEC staff legal bulletin.20  By making the change known immediately,
participants could quickly modify their behavior.  The number of no-ac-
tion letters addressing the exclusion dropped significantly.21
The bulletin, however, only conveyed part of the administrative shift.
The bulletin did not reveal that, simultaneously with the narrowing of the
exclusion, proponents lost the right to cure.  Proposals with language
deemed false, or vague, or irrelevant, would, for the most part, be ex-
cluded, with no ability to revise.
Awareness of the shift in this “long-standing” doctrine only became
clear over time through application.  In 2004 alone, over eighty no action
letters gave proponents the right to cure.  During the next thirteen years,
the number fell to less than ten over the entire period.22  Moreover, in
some cases, the revisions reflected administrative policy rather than edit-
ing concerns.23
The use of encryption matters.  The approach involves administrative
positions typically developed in a non-transparent fashion.  The use of en-
cryption adds uncertainty and cost to the shareholder proposal process.
The approach avoids direct involvement by the Commission and reduces
accountability.
This Article will examine the use of encrypted interpretations under
Rule 14a-8, focusing on the exclusion for false and misleading statements
in subsection (i)(3).  In particular, the piece will chronicle the transforma-
tion of the exclusion into an editing tool, something that included a ro-
bust right to cure.  Eventually, the interpretation of the exclusion
changed, with the Commission essentially conceding that the interpreta-
tion had strayed from the language of the rule.  The final sections will
assess the implication of this approach, including the costs associated with
encryption, and discuss the need for increased transparency and accounta-
bility with respect to informal interpretations of the rule.
19. See infra notes 107–09.
20. Staff legal bulletins represent a summary of staff views. See generally Staff
Legal Bulletins, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal.shtml
[https://perma.cc/GW6D-GAJG] (last visited Dec. 29, 2017).  Staff legal bulletins
in the shareholder proposal space have become common.
21. See app. A (listing sharp drop after 2004 regarding usage of editing func-
tion and right to cure proposals after issuance of publically-announced bulletin).
22. See id. (listing only eight instances of editing and allowing right to cure
between 2005 and 2017).
23. Thus, in one case, issuers were instructed to delete a statement suggesting
Commission agreement with the proposal. See infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
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II. RULE 14A-8 AND THE EXCLUSION FOR FALSE AND MISLEADING
DISCLOSURE
A. The Evolution of Rule 14a-8
Rule 14a-8 originally embodied a remarkably straightforward and un-
complicated approach to shareholder proposals.24  The right extended to
owners, without consideration of the number of shares held or any partic-
ular holding period.25  Applicable issuers had to include all proposals, ex-
cluding only those deemed improper subjects for shareholders, a standard
dependent not on the vagaries of administrative interpretation but on the
requirements of state law.26
The elegant simplicity, however, did not last.  Pressure to restrict
shareholder use of the rule quickly emerged and became a routine fixture
in the evolution of Rule 14a-8.27  Issuers pressured the Commission to add
additional grounds for exclusion and to implement procedural barriers
that would restrict access to the rule.  The changes were sometimes justi-
fied as necessary to deny use of the provision by “special interests”28 or to
24. Adopted in 1942, the Rule was originally numbered X-14a-7, renumbered
X-14a-8 in 1948, and finally Rule 14a-8 in the 1950s. See Securities and Exchange
Commission Release Notice, Exchange Act Release No. 5,436, 1957 WL 7638, at *1
(Jan. 7, 1957) (noting the “new system of numbering” rules and regulations under
the securities laws).
25. See Securities and Exchange Commission Release Notice, Exchange Act
Release No. 3,347, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).  When circulated for com-
ment, the provision originally sought to permit the inclusion of shareholder nomi-
nees.  The concept was, however, not adopted following objections from issuers.
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance and Shareholder Access to the
Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, 1358–60 (2008).
26. Comments on the proposed rule came mostly from issuers. See generally
Bills to Suspend the Authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission Under Section 14
(A) and Section 14 (B) of the Securities Exchange Act to Issue Rules Relating to the Solicita-
tion of Proxies, Consents, and Authorization During the Period of War Emergency: Hearings
on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 78th Cong. 18 (1943) (statement of Ganson Purcell, SEC Comm’r) (not-
ing that for rules adopted in 1942, “We received written comments from in excess
of 500 person or corporations, of course mostly the companies to be affected”).
27. Early use of the rule was modest but nonetheless troubling to some issu-
ers. See Brown, Evolving Role, supra note 9, at 153–54.
28. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *2 (Sept. 18, 1997) (noting one purpose of
the rule is to streamline administration “whereby companies are permitted to ex-
clude proposals furthering . . . special interests”).
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prevent shareholder harassment29 and abuse30 of management.  At the
same time, however, calls for additional restrictions often aligned with
“spikes” in the number of proposals,31 suggesting concern with “active
use”32 rather than actual abuse.33
29. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 19135, 1982 WL 600869, at *14 (Oct. 14, 1982) (“There has been an
increase in the number of proposals used to harass issuers into giving the propo-
nent some particular benefit or to accomplish objectives particular to the propo-
nent.”); see also Robert K. McConnaughey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Address at the American Society of Corporate Secretaries at the Harvard Club of
New York City (Nov. 10, 1948), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1948/
111048mcconnaughey.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ3U-V7YJ] (“You are also aware,
of course, that in a few cases managements have been badgered by proposals
which apparently were not submitted in good faith, or were submitted for the pur-
pose of achieving some ulterior personal objective unrelated to the interests of the
corporation.”).
30. Instances of abuse were rarely discussed at length in the relevant releases.
Moreover, in at least some instances, the alleged abuse was not systematic but the
result of a single or small number of investors.  Thus, for example, concern arose
over the “abuse” of multiple submissions by shareholders to a single company. See
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 9432, 1971 WL 126135, at *1
(Dec. 22, 1971) (“The Commission has also noted that security holders have sub-
mitted a large number of identical proposals to a number of companies. . . . Where
a security holder submits proposals and then does not appear at the meetings of
the companies involved, all security holders have been put to considerable ex-
pense to no purpose.  The Commission regards this practice as an abuse of the
rule and intends to monitor the practice in the future.”).  The “abuse” was, appar-
ently, the result of a single shareholders. See Rand Ingersoll Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1978 WL 13152, at *8 (Feb. 22, 1978) (“In 1971, Mr. Shields submitted
shareholder proposals to more than thirty companies.  Although Mr. Shields had
stated his intention to present these proposals at the various annual meetings, he
failed to do so.  Early in 1972, several companies stated to the Commission staff
that they believed Mr. Shields’ new proposals should be excludable on the grounds
of his prior ‘bad faith’ conduct.  The staff agreed . . . .”); see also William J. Casey,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks on New Proxy Rules, Address at
the Corporate Law Conference, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1972), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/1972/092172casey.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7N8-
E537] (“During the 1972 proxy season, the staff issued no-action letters with re-
spect to proposals submitted by persons having a record of buying a share of stock
in several companies, submitting multiple proposals to those companies, and not
following through with a serious effort to have the proposals considered and de-
bated.  Thus by taking this administrative action, the Commission conserved its
own resources and made it easier for companies to protect themselves from unnec-
essary cost and trouble.”).
31. See Brown, Evolving Role, supra note 9, at 152.
32. See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Related to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20091, 1983
WL 33272, at *13 (Aug. 16, 1983) (Comm’r Longstreth, dissenting) (“I do not
believe the active use of the proxy machinery by shareholders is, of itself, an abuse;
therefore, I do not favor changes the effect of which will be to reduce that usage by
responsible shareholders.”).
33. Thus, for example, commentators viewed as an abuse the ability of share-
holders who resubmitted proposals after making “subtle” changes, although the
practice was permitted by administrative interpretation. See Memorandum from
Linda Quinn, Bill Morley & John Gorman, to Lee Spencer & John Huber, at 26
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The Commission amended the rule to add significant restrictions in
1948,34 1954,35 and 1983.36  Notice and comment generally preceded
these changes,37 facilitating participation by interested parties.38  Moreo-
ver, the Administrative Procedure Act required a mandatory delay in the
effective date of any change,39 giving shareholders time to develop work-
arounds and practices designed to address the impact of the revisions.40
(June 7, 1983), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b
45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1980/1983_0607_Revision14a8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/335G-T8QA] (“The majority of the commentators did support
the change suggesting that it was an appropriate response to counter the abuse of
the process by certain proponents that make subtle changes in proposals each year
which permit them to keep raising the same issue despite the fact that sharehold-
ers have indicated by their votes that they are not interested in that issue.”).
34. See generally Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 4185, 1948 WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948).
35. See generally Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 4979, 1954 WL 5772 (Jan. 6, 1954).  For a further discussion of the 1954
amendments’ effect on proposals, see generally David C. Bayne et al., Proxy Regula-
tion and the Rule-Making Process: The 1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REV. 387 (1954).
36. See generally Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities and Ex-
change Act Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No.
20091, 1983 WL 33272; Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, Comment, The 1983 Amendments to
Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV.
161, 196 (1984) (“[T]he amendments represent a serious restriction on share-
holder participation in corporate governance and a retreat from the goal of man-
agement accountability.”).
37. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).  In rare cases, changes were not part
of the proposed amendments but were only added at the time of adoption.  In at
least one case, shareholders successfully challenged the amendment for failing to
provide an opportunity for the requisite notice and comment. See United Church
Bd. for World Ministries v. SEC, 617 F. Supp. 837, 841 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding
SEC’s inadequate and ambiguous notices of rule changes denied plaintiff minority
shareholders administrative due process).
38. See generally Exchange Act Release No. 20091 (discussing comments re-
ceived on proposed amendments).
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
40. The history of the rule is filled with examples of work arounds that were
labeled abuses.  For example, the rule originally imposed a word limit that applied
only to the statement of support for the proposal.  Predictably, shareholders
shifted some of the explanation to the proposal itself. See, e.g., Shareholder Pro-
posals, Exchange Act Release No. 9432, 1971 WL 126135, at *1 (Dec. 22, 1971)
(“Sometimes a security holder in submitting a proposal to the management of the
issuer will include a preamble or series of ‘whereases’ which are in effect argu-
ments in support of the proposal.  These arguments are in addition to the permit-
ted 100-word statement and appear to be an attempt to circumvent the 100-word
limit.”).  The Commission determined that “any statements in the text of a pro-
posed resolution which are in effect arguments in support of the proposal are to
be considered a part of the supporting statement and subject to the 200-word limi-
tation.” Id.  Ultimately, the Commission amended the Rule to apply the word limit
to both the proposal and the supporting statement. See Exchange Act Release No.
20091, at *11 (“A proposal and its supporting statement in the aggregate shall not
exceed 500 words.”).
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In at least some instances, the comment process resulted in changes to the
proposed amendments.41
B. The Exclusion for False and Misleading Statements
1. Adoption
Codifying existing administrative interpretation,42 the exclusion for
false and misleading disclosure43 only became an explicit part of the rule
in 1976.44  Proposals or supporting statements could be omitted to the
extent “contrary to any of the Commission’s proxy rules” something that
expressly included violations of “Rule 14a-9 which prohibits materially
false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials.”45
The language clarified that the exclusion applied not merely to inac-
curate statements but to those that also violated Rule 14a-9.46  The an-
tifraud provision encompassed “materially” false and misleading
41. See Brown, Evolving Role, supra note 9, at 156 n.40 (noting corporate
spokesmen’s feelings of “victory” after passage of 1954 amendments led to de-
creased number of proposals).
42. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No.
9343, 1976 WL 160410, at *6 (July 7, 1976) (noting exclusion “would simply for-
malize a ground for omission that the Commission believes is inherent in the ex-
isting rule”); see also Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12999, 1976 WL 160347, at *9 (Nov. 22, 1976)
(“This provision simply formalizes a ground for omission that the Commission be-
lieves has been inherent in the proxy rules.”).  The exclusion of proposals deemed
violations of Rule 14a-9 had been a longstanding practice. See, e.g., Div. of Corp.
Fin., Summary of Interpretations, Commission Minute re: Union Electric Com-
pany, at 205–06 (Feb. 24, 1961), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016
cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1960/1960_1964_
Interprt_Corp_Finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8U9-9PWF] (approving exclusion
of proposals seeking to “censure of certain officers for ‘profiteering’” under Rule
14a-8 and Rule 14a-9).
43. The Commission also added an exclusion for proposals that violated the
law, something that presumably encompassed those considered fraudulent or in
conflict with the proxy rules. See Exchange Act Release No. 12999, at *8.  Propos-
als violating Rule 14a-9 were already subject to exclusion from the proxy card. See
J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Proxy Rules and Restrictions on Shareholder Voting Rights, 47
SETON HALL L. REV. 45, 62 n.84 (2016).
44. See Exchange Act Release No. 12999, at *17–18.  Although added to the
rule in 1976, the approach mostly codified existing administrative interpretations.
See supra note 42.
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(3) (2017).
46. See Exchange Act Release No. 12999, at *8 (“The Commission is aware
that on many occasions in the past proponents have submitted proposals and or
supporting statements that contravene one or more of its proxy rules and regula-
tions.  Most often, this situation has occurred when proponents have submitted
items that contain false or misleading statements.  Statements of that nature are
prohibited from inclusion in proxy soliciting materials by Rule 14a-9 of the proxy
rules.”).
8
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statements47 made with the requisite state of mind.48  Rule 14a-9 ad-
dressed a number of explicit prohibitions, including statements that “im-
pugn[ed] character” or charged “illegal or immoral conduct . . . without
factual foundation.”49
Once added, the language of the exclusion underwent no significant
change.50 In 1982, the Commission concluded that “the staff’s practice
[with respect to the exclusion] has worked well.”51  The rewriting of the
exclusion into plain English in 1998 resulted in a renumbering of the pro-
vision but did not give rise to any substantive changes.52
2. Editing Tool
Although narrowly written, the exclusion quickly took on a much
broader scope.  Issuers confronted proposals that, while not false, in-
cluded factual errors and irrelevant references.  Supporting statements
sometimes resorted to pejorative statements,53 negative characteriza-
47. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (describ-
ing materiality standard).
48. See generally J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLO-
SURE (4th ed. 2017).
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 n.b.  The language was added in 1956. See Adop-
tion of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 5276, 1956 WL
7757, at *4 (Jan. 17, 1956).
50. The Commission did, however, acknowledge and approve administrative
interpretations not otherwise appearing in the rule. See Amendments to Rule 14a-
8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20091, 1983 WL 33272, at *6 (Aug. 16, 1983)
(“The Commission indicated that it believed it appropriate for the staff to give
proponents the opportunity to amend portions of proposals or supporting state-
ments which might be violative of Rule 14a-9 at the time they were submitted, since
issuers are accorded the same opportunities with respect to their soliciting materi-
als.  While some commentators were critical of the latitude given to proponents to
make such modifications, the Commission has determined not to change its ad-
ministration of paragraph (c)(3).”).
51. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No.
19135, 1982 WL 600869, at *13 (Oct. 14, 1982).
52. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 23200, 1998 WL 254809, at *2 (May 21, 1998) (“We are adopting minor
plain-English revisions to paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) under Question 9, former
rules 14a-8(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4).” (footnotes omitted)).  The amendments did
specify that the misstatement had to be material. See 17 CFR § 240.14a-8(i)(3)
(prohibiting “materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materi-
als”).  The release, however, provided no insight into the amendment, suggesting
that the change codified existing interpretation.
53. See, e.g., USX Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 285933, at *1 (Feb. 1,
1990) (finding that the term “nincompoops” could be deleted as a violation of
Rule 14a-9).
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tions,54 and unsupported assertions.55  The exclusion for false and mis-
leading statements became the tool for editing out problematic language
that did not necessarily constitute false and misleading disclosure56 re-
quired by Rule 14a-8.57
As a result of encryption, the broad approach became apparent only
through application.  The exclusion extended to statements characterized
54. References to compensation as “lavish” or payments described as “over-
reaching” were viewed as possibly “false.”  Am. Elec. Power Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1977 WL 15064, at *10 (Feb. 28, 1977).  The terms “windfall” and “bo-
nanza” were viewed as possibly “misleading.” See Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54158, at *1 (Apr. 5, 1985) (“[T]he proponent has
indicated in his letter dated February 14, 1985, his willingness to substitute the
word ‘gain’ for the word ‘windfall,’ and to substitute the word ‘premium’ for the
word ‘bonanza.’  Assuming that these revisions are made promptly, this Division
does not believe that the management may rely on Rule 14a-8(c)(3) as a basis for
omitting this paragraph.”).
55. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 17624, at *4 (Mar.
17, 1980) (finding statement was misleading due to absence of “adequate
substantiation”).
56. Thus, a no-action letter found as “vague and indefinite” a proposal seek-
ing to require that persons own not “less than 1,000 shares of the common stock of
the Corporation may be elected to the Board of Directors” because the proponent
did not clarify whether ownership “must be actual ownership or whether beneficial
ownership would be sufficient.”  Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1990 WL 286068, at *1–2 (Feb. 16, 1990).  The proponent did, however,
receive the right to correct the “defect.” See id. at *1; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 245570, at *1 (Feb. 17, 1989) (proposal calling for
ownership of at least 2000 shares of common or preferred stock “vague and indefi-
nite” for failing to specify whether ownership “may be aggregated or if ownership
of derivative instruments . . . would be sufficient”).
57. In some cases, the exclusion applied to proposals that provided share-
holders with additional, potentially material, information.  Thus, where the com-
pany, rather than shareholders, had the right to determine whether to include the
identity of the proponent and the number of shares held, efforts to include the
same information in the proposal or supporting statement was treated as “false and
misleading.” See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL
233966, at *1 (Jan. 12, 1988) (“There appears to be some basis for your view that
the reference to the number of Company securities held by the proponent may be
omitted . . . . Under the circumstances, this Division will not recommend any en-
forcement action to the Commission if the Company omits ‘1,050,200’ from the
first line of the first paragraph of the supporting statement in its proxy material.”).
10
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as confusing58  or irrelevant59 or inconsistent.60  So were references con-
sidered “vague and indefinite.”61  The editing process addressed word us-
58. Penn Cent. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 26271, at *1 (Mar. 18,
1981) (“There appears to be some basis for your opinion that the proposed report,
by requiring disclosure of ‘all’ payments to governmental entities, including such
benefits as revenues on sales, and loan payments, as well as regulatory burdens,
could be confusing to shareholders.”); see also CBS Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
2015 WL 274189, at *22 (Mar. 10, 2015) (“Because of the confusing message of the
Proposal, a reasonable shareholder would be uncertain as to whether he or she is
being asked to vote on a proposal related to management’s fulsome review of any
and all Company policies related to any and all human rights or a proposal related
to management’s review of Company policies to evaluate anti-retaliation protec-
tions for employees taking part in government.”); Knight-Ridder, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1995 WL 765455, at *1 (Dec. 28, 1995) (“There appears to be some
basis for your view that the paragraphs five, six and seven of the supporting state-
ment may be confusing and misleading to shareholders because they are unrelated
to the subject matter of the proposal in violation of rule 14a-8(c)(3).”).
59. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 11012,
at *20 (Mar. 9, 1976) (“There also appears to be some basis for your counsel’s view
that the entire supporting statement for the proposal may be omitted under Rule
14a-9 because it deals with a matter (viz., the compensation of certain officers and
directors) that does not seem to have any relevance to the subject matter of the
proposal.  Accordingly, it could be both confusing and misleading to the com-
pany’s security holders.”).
60. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 55821, at
*1 (Mar. 16, 1992) (“Accordingly, the second paragraph of the supporting state-
ment should either be deleted or the discussion revised so that the object of the
distribution—apparently all the Company’s non-merchandizing groups—is con-
sistently referred to throughout.”).
61. The standard at least initially applied only where a proposal was “so inher-
ently vague and indefinite that the shareholders voting upon the proposals would
not be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or
measures the Company would take in the event the proposals were implemented.”
See EI du Pont de Nemours & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶
81,122, 1977 WL 11653, at *6 (Feb. 8, 1977); In re Am. Tel., & Tel. Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1977 WL 13620, at *5 (Jan. 18, 1977) (“[W]e agree with your view
that the descriptive term ‘representative of the general public’ is so vague and
indefinite that the shareholders may not know what type of person they are being
asked to vote upon for possible membership on the Company’s board of direc-
tors.”); see also Xerox Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 12825, at *7 (Mar. 10,
1977) (concurring in the view that proposal was “so inherently vague and indefi-
nite that the shareholders voting upon the proposal would not be able to deter-
mine with any reasonable certainty exactly what action or measures the Company
would take in the event the proposal were implemented” and that proposal “may
be misleading, in that, any action ultimately taken by the Company upon the im-
plementation of the proposal could be quite different from the type of action envi-
sioned by the shareholders at the time their votes were cast”); Coca-Cola Co., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 11671, at *5 (Feb. 24, 1977) (finding “some basis” for
the opinion that the proposal was “so inherently vague and indefinite that the
shareholders voting upon the proposal would not be able” to determine with “any
reasonable certainty exactly what action” would be taken “in the event the proposal
were implemented”).  The language derived from an early formulation developed
by the Commission and found by a court not to be arbitrary. See Dyer v. SEC, 287
F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1961) (“[I]t appears to us that the proposal, as drafted and
submitted to the company, is so vague and indefinite as to make it impossible for
either the board of directors or the stockholders at large to comprehend precisely
11
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age,62 small mistakes,63 typos,64 improper use of tenses,65 and colorful
adjectives.66
what the proposal would entail.”).  The interpretation found its way into the rule
even before the adoption of the exclusion. See Long Island Lighting Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1973 WL 9145, at *5 (Feb. 28, 1973) (arguing proposal was excluda-
ble under Dyer “because it is unclear as to what is being proposed”); see also Phillips
Petroleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8856, at *6–7 (Feb. 19, 1974) (rely-
ing on Dyer and seeking exclusion on the basis of “vague and indefinite” language).
62. See, e.g., Integrated Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66947, at
*1, 4 (June 9, 1986) (where supporting statement provided that “Since each of our
top officers receives between $1,303,552 and $1,803,303 in annual compensation”
the no action letter agreed that the company could omit the word “Since” in order
“to avoid any confusion that might otherwise result”).
63. See, e.g., Wash., Water Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 85656,
at *1 (Mar. 22, 1993) (“The reference to book value in paragraph number one
should be revised from 5% to 5.8 percent.”); Chevron Corp., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, 1988 WL 235380, at *1 (Dec. 16, 1988) (authorizing proponent to revise pro-
posal to “make the reference to ‘beneficial owner’ plural, as it appears from the
remainder of the proposal and supporting statement that this was his intent”);
Barris Indus. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235023, at *2 (Sept. 30, 1988)
(finding “some basis for . . . view that the language ‘only one independent outside
Director’ in the first sentence of the eighth paragraph of the supporting statement
may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(3).  Assuming, however, that the proponent
promptly amends the referenced sentence to refer to two independent outside
directors, this Division does not believe that the Company may rely on Rule 14a-
8(c)(3) . . . .”); see also Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL
23306671, at *1 (Sept. 25, 2003) (“Amend the reference in the seventh paragraph
to the ‘TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on Corporate Governance’ to refer to the
‘CREF Policy Statement on Corporate Governance’”),
64. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286195, at *1
(Mar. 9, 1990) (“There appears to be some basis for your view that the third
‘Whereas’ clause is false and, therefore, excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(3).  It ap-
pears, however, that this defect could be cured if the proponent corrects the ap-
parent typographical error ‘17,5000’ by changing such number to ‘17,500.’”).
65. See, e.g., Wis. Power & Light Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14331, at
*3 (Feb. 14, 1980) (“Although there appears to be some basis for your view that
the third ‘WHEREAS’ clause of the proposal is confusingly worded, we note that
[the proponent] has stated that the penultimate word in the clause should be
amended to read ‘increase,’ rather than ‘increased.’  In light of this amendment,
the staff is unable to conclude that management may omit the clause from its
proxy material.”).
66. See, e.g., FPL Grp., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178551, at *1, 2
(Mar. 12, 1991) (in supporting statement no action letter agreed that “[t]he word
‘disastrous’ appearing in the fifth paragraph should be deleted”).
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss1/2
2018] LIMITS OF ENCRYPTED INTERPRETATIONS 47
Proposals could be challenged as a result of the complete absence of
citations67 or the presence of incorrect citations,68 the reliance on refer-
ences no longer current,69 and the failure to identify organizations or en-
tities.70  Edits included the need to replace a paraphrased statement with a
direct quote.71  A proposal referring to “majority” support of shareholders
had to be rewritten to state a “majority of the votes cast.”72
Negative references about the issuer or management often received
particular attention.  A no-action letter characterized the statement “a
glaring violation of corporate democracy” as misleading.73  Calling leader-
67. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 253681, at *1
(Feb. 6, 2004) (requiring proponent to “provide a citation”); Am. Elec. Power Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 171251, at *1 (Jan. 16, 2002) (proposal will not be
treated as false and misleading where proponent “provide[s] factual support for”
specified paragraph); RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
2000 WL 283138, at *1 (Mar. 7, 2000) (requiring proponent to provide specified
citations); see also Northrop Grumman Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL
203928, at *1 (Feb. 16, 2001) (requiring proponent to provide “factual support”).
68. See, e.g., Raytheon Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 126406, at *1
(Mar. 9, 1999) (stating that proposal would not be false and misleading where
references to article in the New York Times or Aviation Week were “deleted”).  Alter-
natively, they had to be properly characterized. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 2004 WL
253681, at *1 (requirement that reference to article in the Wall Street Journal be
revised to clarify “that the article refers to an opinion article”).
69. See, e.g., PACCAR Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 98612, at *1 (Feb.
22, 1999) (proposal could avoid being misleading by updating statement regarding
a strike “to reflect the current status of the strike”); see also Northrop Grumman, 2001
WL 203928, at *1 (requiring revision of statement about lawsuit “to indicate the
current status of the lawsuit”); Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1993 WL 4457, at *1 (Jan. 6, 1993) (“[T]he term ‘current’ may be vague given the
fact that the proxy materials will be distributed several months subsequent to the
date of the proposal and supporting statement . . . .”).
70. See, e.g., Marriott Int’l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 597336, at *1
(Mar. 19, 2002) (“specifically identify the institutional investors that the proponent
refers to”); Northrop Grumman, 2001 WL 203928, at *1 (where proposal referred to
“a respected proxy advisory firm,” proponent required to “specifically identify the
proxy advisory firm”); Staten Island Bancorp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL
354382, at *1 (Mar. 21, 2000) (“supporting statement may be false or misleading
under rule 14a-9” unless proponent identifies “the institutions that comprise the
‘regional peer group’ and the ‘asset-size peer group’”); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, 1993 WL 93602, at *1 (Mar. 25, 1993) (statement of support is “poten-
tially false and misleading in contravention of Rule 14a-9” unless proponent
deletes reference to “[f]ive other known cases” or “clearly” identifies the cases).
71. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser, 2004 WL 253681, at *1 (encouraging company to
revise sentences to “directly quote the sentence from the source”).
72. See Champion Int’l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286230, at *1
(Mar. 13, 1990) (“There appears to be some basis for your view that the statement
in the fifth ‘Whereas’ clause that ‘similar proposals received a majority at some
companies’ may be misleading.  However, it appears that this defect can be cured
if such statement is revised to read ‘similar proposals received a majority of the
votes cast at some companies.’”).
73. See Astrex, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 12823, at *5 (June 7,
1978).
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ship “inept” could only remain if recast as an opinion.74  False and mis-
leading captured a reference to financial materials “significantly
understat[ing]” values75 and the claim that “Trustees paint an overly rosy
financial picture.”76
3. Right to Cure
The broad application of the exclusion was tempered through the
addition of a right to cure.77  An administrative graft, proponents often
had an opportunity to fix the challenged language.  Although surfacing
occasionally through the 1970s,78 application of the right to revise ex-
panded as a result of a deliberate policy decision79 that was approved by
74. See Amax Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 52080, at *1 (Feb. 13,
1985).
75. Cent. Jersey Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14305, at *1
(Mar. 27, 1980).
76. Cal. Real Estate Inv. Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14299, at *2
(Mar. 27, 1980).
77. The right predated the adoption of the exclusion. See Travelers Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8836, at *7 (Jan. 22, 1974) (“There appears to be
some basis for your opinion that the proposal, as revised, may be omitted from the
company’s proxy material because it is vague and indefinite.  That is, the word
‘significant,’ as used in the phrase ‘significant quantities of goods and services,’ is
subject to varying interpretations because there is no precise definition for it in the
context of the proposal . . . . Under the circumstances, unless the proponent
promptly revises the parts of the proposal and supporting statement mentioned
above to cure the defects existing therein, this Division will not recommend any
action to the Commission if the proposal and related supporting statement are
omitted from the company’s proxy material.”); see also Ipco Hosp. Supply Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8327, at *3 (Aug. 16, 1974) (“There does appear,
however, to be some basis for your view that the term ‘total annual budgeted fi-
nancing’ used in the proposal is unclear in that it is not known whether the propo-
nent is referring to total annual budgeted expenditures, or merely to the amount
of financing, if any, that the company may budget for any one year.  Accordingly,
unless the proponent promptly revises the part of the proposal mentioned in the
preceding sentence to cure the ambiguity therein, this Division will not recom-
mend any enforcement action to the Commission if the proposal is omitted from
the company’s proxy material.”).
78. See, e.g., Div. of Corp. Fin., Summary of Interpretations, Commission Min-
ute re: American Telephone and Telegraph Company, at 10 (Jan. 31, 1964), http:/
/3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.
com/collection/papers/1960/1960_1964_Interprt_Corp_Finance.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MHH7-B5Z7] (“Commission concurred with Division that proposal
should be included if the words ‘and impartial’ are deleted since New York State
Law requires inspectors act with ‘strict impartiality.’”); Id. at 216 (noting stock-
holder proposals providing for secret voting not subject to exclusion “after further
revision of language”).
79. See Statement of Peter J. Romeo, SEC Official, to SEC Historical Society, at
6 (Feb. 20, 2014), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c
579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/2010/2014_0220_Statement_
RomeoT.pdf [https://perma.cc/A593-3FLR] (“Innovative ways sometimes were
found in these discussions to allow more proposals to be included in proxy state-
ments than had previously been the case.  One such method was to allow the pro-
ponent of a proposal that was potentially false or misleading in relatively minor
14
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the Commission.80  As a result, no-action letters characterizing statements
as false and misleading often allowed shareholders to make revisions and
remove the offending language.81
The extent of the revisions varied.  Leaving little discretion, the no-
action letters often provided specific instructions on the how to handle
the concerns.  Language would need to be rewritten as specified or omit-
ted entirely.  Statistics sometime had to be described as “approxima-
tion[s]”82 and statements as opinions.83  Thus, a description of a
company’s bylaws as “not shareholder friendly” was viewed as false and
misleading unless characterized as an opinion.84
respects to revise the proposal to eliminate the concerns raised by the company.
Previously, no ‘second bite at the apple’ was permitted to proponents in these
situations.”).
80. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders,
Exchange Act Release No. 12999, 1976 WL 160347, at *5 (Nov. 22, 1976) (“[T]he
Commission wishes to reiterate a view that its staff has expressed informally on
many occasions in the past.  That is, changes to a timely submitted proposal or
supporting statement may be made by the proponent after the timeliness deadline
has passed, provided the changes are minor in nature and do not alter the sub-
stance of the proposal.  Examples of such changes would be a change in the form
of the proposal to bring it into accord with the requirements of the applicable
state law, or a change in the proposal or supporting statement to revise or delete
misleading statements contained therein.”).
81. See, e.g., Memorandum from Bill Morley, to John Huber & Linda Quinn,
at 2 (Nov. 16, 1983), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197
c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1980/1983_1116_Statistical
Shareholder.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SNX-EBAJ] (“In addition to the five propos-
als excluded in their entirety under Rule 14a-8(c)(3), that Rule was cited and re-
lied upon in almost all of the twenty-seven cases where proposals were required to
be revised before they could be included.”).
82. Boeing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107646, at *1 (Feb. 19, 1987)
(“There appears to be some basis for your view that the language ‘only 350 are
Catholic’ in the second ‘whereas’ clause may be misleading in that it states as fact
information tha[sic] appears reasonably to be subject to dispute.  It appears, how-
ever, that this defect would be cured if the clause were modified to state the figure
given as an approximation based on the information available to the proponent.”);
see Healthway Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234171, at *1 (Mar. 25,
1988) (“[T]here appears to be some basis for your view that the sentences contain-
ing the figures ‘32 million,’ ‘$4.5 million,’ ‘36.5 million,’ and ‘between $17 to $18’
may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(3), unless those sentences are amended to
indicate that each of these figures is an approximation.”).
83. See TRW Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 64618, at *1 (Feb. 11, 1999)
(proposal would not be misleading where statements “recast as the proponent’s
opinion”); Dayton Power & Light Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15267, at *4
(Feb. 28, 1980) (noting that proposal should be “promptly revised to add, where
appropriate, the words ‘in our opinion,’ or some similar expression, to indicate
that the statements therein represent the personal opinions of the proponent”);
Wis. Power & Light Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14331, at *4 (Feb. 14,
1980) (“With respect to the second and third sentences of the first paragraph of
the supporting statement, there appears to be some basis for your view that these
sentences express opinions of the proponents without being designated as such.”).
84. See SI Handling Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 565125, at *1
(May 5, 2000) (“In our view, the statement that ‘the current By-Laws are not share-
holder friendly’ must be recast as the proponent’s opinion.”).
15
Brown: Shareholder Proposals and the Limits of Encrypted Interpretations
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
50 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 35
The mandatory revisions could involve wordsmithing.  In one in-
stance, the proponent had to replace a reference to “many” with “some.”85
In another, “associate” was to be changed to “colleague”86 and “policy” to
“objective.”87  Reference to a third-party report required inclusion of the
date.88
No-action letters sometimes instructed the issuer to make the edits.89
In general, this occurred where the changes involved straightforward
omissions.90 In other instances, proponents had the responsibility to re-
85. See Tri-Cont’l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 541193, at *3 (Mar.
15, 2004) (highlighting that the offending phrase stated that “many corporations
have adopted cumulative voting” (internal quotations omitted)).
86. Barris Indus. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235023, at *1 (Sept. 30,
1988) (“Assuming the proponent promptly revises the final clauses of the second
sentence of the first paragraph of supporting statement and the first sentence of
the eighth paragraph of the supporting statement to replace ‘associates’ with ‘col-
leagues,’ this Division does not believe that the Company may rely on Rule 14a-
8(c)(3) as a basis for omitting those clauses.”); see Hous. Indus. Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, 1990 WL 286282, at *1 (Mar. 28, 1990) (“It appears, however, that this
defect could be cured if the word ‘would’ appearing after the word ‘money’ were
changed to ‘could.’  Assuming that the proposal is revised in the foregoing man-
ner within seven calendar days of receipt of this letter, the Division does not be-
lieve that the proposal may be omitted under Rule 14a-8(c)(3).”).
87. Emerson Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 17387, at *2 (Dec. 12,
1980) (“[T]here does appear to be some basis for your opinion that the third
whereas is false and misleading because ‘the Company has never adopted a policy’
as that referred to in the clause.  However, we believe that this defect could be
cured if the word ‘objective’ is substituted for ‘policy.’”).
88. See Chevron Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176658, at *1 (Feb.
13, 1991) (“There appears to be some basis, however, for your view that certain
portions of the supporting statement accompanying the proposal may be deleted
under rule 14a-8(c)(3) unless revised as follows: the first sentence in the first para-
graph of the supporting statement should state ‘1988’ in lieu of 1989 and the last
sentence in the third paragraph should indicate the date of the referenced study
(viz, 1986).”).
89. See, e.g., Men’s Wearhouse, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 833595,
at *1 (Mar. 25, 2002) (“[U]nless the proponents provide The Men’s Wearhouse
with a proposal and supporting statement revised in this manner, within seven
calendar days after receiving this letter, we will not recommend enforcement ac-
tion to the Commission if The Men’s Wearhouse omits only these portions of the
supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).”); see
also Occidental Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 4457, at *1 (Jan.
6, 1993) (“[U]nless the proponent revises the supporting statement [as specified]
. . . the Division will not recommend any action if those portions of the statement
are omitted from the Company’s proxy materials.”).
90. See, e.g., Emerging Ger. Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL
890121, at *3 (Dec. 22, 1998) (“[I]f [proponent] does not revise the statement
indicated within seven calendar days after receiving this letter, we would not rec-
ommend enforcement action against the Fund if this paragraph were omitted
from the Fund’s proxy soliciting materials in reliance upon rule 14a-8(i)(3).”); see
also Northrop Grumman Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 203928, at *1
(Feb. 16, 2001) (“[U]nless the proponent provides Northrop Grumman with a
proposal and supporting statement revised in this manner, within seven calendar
days after receiving this letter, we will not recommend enforcement action to the
16
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write statements or to delete phrases,91 sentences,92 and paragraphs.93
The editing instructions94 sometimes came with a deadline.95  Inadequate
revisions could be a basis for exclusion96 of either the proposal97 or the
supporting statement.98
Not every proponent received a right to cure.  Omission of the entire
proposal could occur for submissions deemed false and misleading “in
their entirety.”99  Proposals requiring “highly subjective” determinations
Commission if Northrop Grumman omits only these portions of the proposal and
supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).”).
91. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL
203928, at *1 (Feb. 16, 2001) (requiring deletion of “phrases”).
92. See, e.g., Cendant Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 187657, at *1
(Jan. 16, 2004) (requiring deletion of specified sentence from the supporting
statement).
93. See, e.g., IBM Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 1723896, at *1 (Dec.
21, 2001) (requiring deletion of specified paragraphs).
94. Thus, shareholders failing to note a possible “conflict with the indemnifi-
cation[s] . . . of the Company’s by-laws” were instructed to “amend[ ] the proposal
so as to eliminate [the] defect.”  Fla. Power Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL
26583, at *2 (Jan. 21, 1981).
95. The common time period was seven calendar days. See, e.g., Dominion
Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178477, at *1 (Feb. 15, 1991) (“Assum-
ing the Proponent revises the proposal in the manner indicated within seven cal-
endar days of receipt of this response, the staff does not believe that the Company
may rely on Rule 14a-8(c)(3) as a basis for omitting the proposal from its proxy
materials.”); see also Pinnacle W. Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL
178547, at *1 (Mar. 11, 1991) (“Assuming the Proponent provides the Company
with a proposal revised in the manner indicated, within seven calendar days after
receipt of this response, the staff does not believe that rule 14a-8(c)(3) may be
relied on as a basis to omit the proposal from the Company’s proxy materials.”).
96. See, e.g., Fla. Power Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13865, at *1
(Feb. 6, 1979) (“[I]n the staff’s view, the proposal as revised on February 3 would
also be excludable in reliance upon Rule 14a-8(c)(3).”).
97. See, e.g., Am. Home Prods. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 11667,
at *6 (Feb. 23, 1977) (“If, however, revisions are not promptly made by the propo-
nent, this Division will not recommend any action to the Commission if the propo-
sal and supporting statement are excluded from the Company’s proxy material.”);
see also Am. Elec. Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 15064, at *10 (Feb.
23, 1977) (same).
98. See, e.g., Staten Island Bancorp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL
354382, at *1 (Mar. 21, 2000) (“[U]nless [proponent] provides Staten Island with
a proposal revised in this manner, within seven days after receiving this letter, we
will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if Staten Island omits
all of the supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-
8(i)(3).”); TF Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 38380, at *1 (Jan. 28,
1999) (same).
99. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals to Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No.
19135, 1982 WL 600869, at *13 (Oct. 14, 1982) (“As with any preliminary proxy
material, the proponent is given the opportunity to amend his submission to cor-
rect the Rule 14a-9 problems, except where it is clear that the proposal and sup-
porting statement in their entirety are false or misleading or otherwise are so
vague and ambiguous that the issuer and its security holders would not be able to
determine what action the proposal is contemplating.”).
17
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were at risk.100  Similarly, the right to correct would not apply where the
matter required “detailed and extensive editing.”101
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REWRITING OF RULE 14A-8(I)(3)
Application of the exclusion entailed a balance.  The broad interpre-
tation allowed the exclusion to be used to address a variety of concerns
presented by proposals otherwise unaddressed by the rule.  The edits
could improve quality, ensure better written proposals, and reduce confu-
sion.  In at least some cases, the revisions rendered the presentation more
neutral and less critical of issuer behavior.
At the same time, the no-action letters balanced the approach with a
broad right to cure.  Shareholders might disagree with the edits but at
least could avoid exclusion of their proposal by making the mandated
changes.  The administrative graft also represented a form of equal treat-
ment.  Issuers prefiling proxy materials received a similar opportunity.102
The encrypted nature of the editing function meant that the bounda-
ries of the interpretation were never clearly articulated.  In particular, the
tipping point for proposals that could be excluded rather than rewritten
remained uncertain.  As a result, issuers had an incentive to test constantly
the reach of the exclusion, increasing the number of requests for no ac-
tion relief.
A. The Administrative Revision
The editing function and the encrypted nature of the approach in-
creased the agency’s workload.  Almost any term or phrase could be chal-
100. See Philip Morris Cos., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176624, at *1
(Feb. 7, 1991) (explaining that proposal was “vague, indefinite and, therefore, po-
tentially misleading” where proposal “appears to involve highly subjective determi-
nations”); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 285820, at *1 (Jan.
12, 1990) (contending that proposal was “vague, indefinite and, therefore, poten-
tially misleading” where implementation “would require the Company to make
highly subjective determinations”).
101. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, supra note 15, at 20 (“[W]hen a
proposal and supporting statement will require detailed and extensive editing in
order to bring them into compliance with the proxy rules, we may find it appropri-
ate for companies to exclude the entire proposal, supporting statement, or both,
as materially false or misleading.”).
102. See Memorandum from Linda Quinn, Bill Morley & John Gorman, to
Lee Spencer & John Humber, supra note 33, at 17 (“We do not believe that any
change is necessary in the provision or in the prevailing staff practice.  In this re-
gard it should be noted that the staff practice permitting proponents to make
changes to correct statements which would be violative of Rule 14a-9 is consistent
with the staff practice in reviewing preliminary proxy materials filed by issuers.”).
18
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lenged as misleading or indefinite,103 with some possibility of success.104
As a result, the editing process evolved into a line-by-line, time-consuming
review that amounted to an inefficient use of resources.105  The invocation
of the exclusion had become ubiquitous, with almost one-half of the no-
action letters issued during the 2004 proxy season addressing subsection
(i)(3)106 and over ninety providing a right to revise.107
Seeking to reduce the use of the exclusion, the Commission unilater-
ally adopted a more narrow interpretation.  Conceding that the reigning
approach had resulted in “an unintended and unwarranted extension of
rule 14a-8(i)(3),”108 a staff legal bulletin announced that statements
would no longer be treated as false and misleading simply because of dis-
agreements over accuracy or a purported absence of adequate support.
Instead, the exclusion would apply only to statements that impugned char-
acter,109 were objectively false,110  were “so inherently vague or indefinite”
that the company and shareholders could not determine what the propo-
sal required, or were “irrelevant . . . such that there is a strong likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would be uncertain as to the matter on
which she is being asked to vote.”111
103. Thus, use of “vivid” words could subject a proposal to challenge. See, e.g.,
Emerging Ger. Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 890121, at *3 (Dec. 22,
1998) (“We disagree that the use of vivid words such as ‘cronies’ and ‘bailing out’
is false and misleading.”).
104. The no-action letter permitted the exclusion of a clause referring to a
“significant increase” in earnings. See Hydron Tech., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1997 WL 232587, at *2 (May 8, 1997) (“There appears to be some basis for your
view that the fourth part of the proposal may be omitted under rule 14a-8(c)(3).
The staff notes in particular that, in this context, the phrase ‘significant increase’ is
vague and indefinite.  Accordingly, the Division is of the view that the fourth part
of the proposal may be omitted under rule 14a-8(c)(3).”).
105. See, e.g., SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B, supra note 17 (“[M]any com-
panies have begun to assert deficiencies in virtually every line of a proposal’s sup-
porting statement as a means to justify exclusion of the proposal in its entirety.
Our consideration of those requests requires the staff to devote significant re-
sources to editing the specific wording of proposals and, especially, supporting
statements.”).
106. See id. (“During the last proxy season, nearly half the no-action requests
we received asserted that the proposal or supporting statement was wholly or par-
tially excludable under rule 14a-8(i)(3).”).
107. See app. A.
108. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B, supra note 17 (“Unfortunately, our
discussion of rule 14a-8(i)(3) in SLB No. 14 has caused the process for company
objections and the staff’s consideration of those objections to evolve well beyond
its original intent.”).
109. See, e.g., id. (“statements directly or indirectly impugn character, integ-
rity, or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly make charges concerning im-
proper, illegal, or immoral conduct or association, without factual foundation”).
110. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he company demonstrates objectively that a factual
statement is materially false or misleading.”).
111. Id. (“[T]he resolution contained in the proposal is so inherently vague
or indefinite that neither the stockholders voting on the proposal, nor the com-
pany in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with
19
Brown: Shareholder Proposals and the Limits of Encrypted Interpretations
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
54 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 35
At least a portion of the administrative approach was not encrypted.
Issuers and proponents did not need to divine the change through an
analysis of no-action letters applying the policy.  Instead, the use of a staff
legal bulletin created immediate awareness of the change.  Issuers and
shareholders could, as a result, immediately change their behavior to re-
flect the approach.  In fact, the number of proposals addressing the exclu-
sion fell the following year.112
B. Elimination of the Right to Cure
The bulletin, however, only revealed a portion of the administrative
shift.  Significant matters remained encrypted.  First, the bulletin indi-
cated a widespread shift in, and narrowing of, the interpretation of (i)(3).
In fact, application would reveal that the most significant change occurred
with respect statements challenged as false and misleading.  No-action let-
ters addressing these sorts of allegations largely ceased.
Challenges to statements or proposals as vague, irrelevant, or confus-
ing, however, were treated differently and continued to be a basis for ex-
clusion.  Similarly, encryption masked significant changes to the right to
revise.  The bulletin acknowledged the “long-standing” nature of the right
and the traditional inapplicability to proposals requiring “detailed and ex-
tensive editing.”113  Application, however, would reveal that, in fact, the
right to cure had been almost entirely eliminated.
In the decade or more following issuance of the bulletin, revisions
were permitted in only a small number of instances.  Moreover, sharehold-
ers received little or no discretion to fashion the changes.  In Rite Aid
Corp.,114 for example, the issuer received the right to delete a sentence in
the supporting statement indicating that “the SEC fully supports this Pro-
posal.”115  In General Electric,116 the issuer was allowed to exclude an image
as irrelevant.117
any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires—
this objection also may be appropriate where the proposal and the supporting
statement, when read together, have the same result . . . .”).
112. See app. A.
113. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, supra note 15, at 22 (“If the proposal
contains specific statements that may be materially false or misleading or irrelevant
to the subject matter of the proposal, we may permit the shareholder to revise or
delete these statements.  Also, if the proposal or supporting statement contains
vague terms, we may, in rare circumstances, permit the shareholder to clarify these
terms.”); see also app. A.
114. SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 332191 (Mar. 13, 2015).
115. Id. at *3.
116. SEC No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 821664 (Feb. 23, 2017).
117. See id. at *1; see also Kroger Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 697559,
at *1 (Mar. 27, 2017) (“There appears to be some basis for your view, however, that
the paragraph in the supporting statement regarding neonics is irrelevant to a
consideration of the subject matter of the proposal, such that there is a strong
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would be uncertain as to the matter on
which he or she is being asked to vote.  Accordingly, we will not recommend en-
20
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In other cases, edits had unique explanations that did not suggest a
broad right to revise.  For example, in one instance, the proposal was sub-
ject to revision because of intervening regulatory changes.118  Another in-
volved language that had been subject to exclusion in an earlier no-action
letter at the same company.119
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENCRYPTED INTERPRETATIONS
Elimination of the right to cure probably had little immediate impact.
By narrowing the types of statements that would be treated as false and
misleading, fewer revisions were necessary.  In the first two years after an-
nouncement of the new policy, no-action letters permitted the omission of
only eight proposals under subsection (i)(3).  The decline, however,
proved temporary.  By 2014, use of the exclusion had again become wide-
spread,120 with twenty-seven proposals omitted under subsection (i)(3).
In the post-2004 period, the exclusion mostly applied to proposals
characterized as “vague and indefinite” rather than false and misleading.
Moreover, despite the purpose of the 2004 release, the concept of vague
and misleading expanded rather than contracted.  The approach applied
to proposals with undefined terms and concepts, even those widely known.
Nor for the most part did proponents receive the right to make revisions
and include missing definitions or explanations.
forcement action to the Commission if Kroger omits only this portion of the sup-
porting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).”).
118. See Sara Lee Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 2664139, at *1 (Sept.
11, 2006) (“[B]ecause the requirements for the Compensation Committee Report
were revised following the deadline for submitting proposals, we believe that the
proposal may similarly be revised to make clear that the advisory vote would relate
to the description of the company’s objectives and policies regarding named exec-
utive officer compensation that is included in the Compensation Discussion and
Analysis.  Accordingly, a proposal that is revised to replace the phrase ‘report of
the Compensation and Employee Benefits Committee’ with the phrase ‘the Com-
pensation Discussion and Analysis’ may not be omitted under rule 14a-8(i)(3).”).
119. See Nicor, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 22682, at *1 (Jan. 3,
2005).  The decision was, apparently, designed to ensure consistency with prior no-
action letters addressing the same language in an earlier proposal submitted to the
same company. See id. at *4 (“Furthermore, the portions quoted below are the
same or substantially similar to false and misleading statements made by the Propo-
nent in the shareholder proposal submitted by the Proponent for Nicor’s 2004
Annual Meeting of Stockholders.  These statements were revised in Nicor’s proxy
materials for its 2004 Annual Meeting following issuance of a Staff no-action letter
and, nonetheless, the Proponent has included the same or similar language in this
Proposal.”).
120. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2014 Proxy Season, GIB-
SON DUNN 2 (June 25, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/docu
ments/Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-During-2014-Proxy-Season.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KSB-5S32] (“Of the shareholder proposals for which no-ac-
tion relief was denied, 58% were challenged as being either vague or false and
misleading under Rule 14a-8(i)(3), making these arguments the most frequently
rejected arguments, as they were during 2012–2013.”).
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A. The Right to Cure and Proposals Deemed “Vague and Indefinite”
Even before the 2004 changes, proposals considered “vague and in-
definite” were subject to exclusion.  The issue often arose in connection
with the use of undefined technical terms or external standards.121  Thus,
proposals were excluded that called for a “GRI-based sustainability re-
port”122 or the use of “SA8000 Social Accountability Standards.”123  The
standard applied to references to obscure code sections124 or FASB guide-
lines.125  Even the inclusion of definitions or explanations did not insulate
a proposal from challenge to the extent not “fairly summarize[d].”126
Shareholders, however, often had a right to revise proposals to add
appropriate definitions127 or to clarify relevant language.128  References
121. See Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 245779, at *1 (Feb. 3,
1989) (“[W]e do not concur in your view that the reference to ‘a beneficial owner’
is so confusing as to make the proposal excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(3) . . . .”);
see also Dow Chem. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 544210, at *1 (Feb. 28,
2005) (use of term “internal controls” not vague and misleading).
122. See Ryland Grp., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 148036, at *1 (Jan.
19, 2005) (proposal asking company to prepare “a GRI-based sustainability report”
considered “vague and indefinite” and subject to exclusion without right to cure);
Terex Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 393992, at *1 (Mar. 1, 2004);
ConAgra Foods, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 1489570, at *1 (July 1,
2004); Dean Foods Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 385738, at *1 (Feb. 25,
2004).
123. See Kohl’s Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 267673, at *6 (Mar. 13,
2001) (concurring in the exclusion of a shareholder proposal in reliance on Rule
l4a-8(i)(3) requesting implementation of the “SA8000 Social Accountability Stan-
dards”); see also TJX Cos., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 267667, at *11 (Mar. 14,
2001); McDonald’s Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 278478, at *10 (Mar.
13, 2001).
124. See, e.g., AT&T Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 673795, at *1 (Feb.
16, 2010) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal that sought a report on,
among other things, “grassroots lobbying communications as defined in 26 C.F.R.
§ 56.4911-2”).
125. See, e.g., Safescript Pharms., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 414589,
at *2 (Feb. 27, 2004) (excluding proposal that called for “all options granted by
the Company be expensed in accordance with FASB guidelines”).
126. See Revlon, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 267670, *2, 12 (Mar. 13,
2001).
127. There were exceptions.  For example, a right to correct an external stan-
dard was not permitted where the proposal contained “inconsistent” references.
This occurred, however, where the problem with the external standard was not the
only linguistic issue arising under the proposal. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1992 WL 18818, at *1 (Jan. 29, 1992) (noting that proposal includ-
ing reference to directors who had taken “the company into bankruptcy or one of
Chapter 7–11 or 13” included “numerous undefined and inconsistent phrases” in-
cluding the reference to Chapter 13, which the company asserted was applicable
“only to individuals”).
128. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 12094,
at *6 (Nov. 2, 1978) (“[U]nless the proponent promptly revises the supporting
statement so as to clarify the terms indicated above, this Division will not recom-
mend any enforcement action to the Commission if the supporting statement is
omitted from the Company’s proxy material.  In considering our enforcement al-
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to “direct and indirect compensation” and “executive perquisites” were “so
vague as to render the proposal misleading” but shareholders could
“promptly amend[ ] the proposal to cure the defects.”129  A proponent
was instructed to promptly “set forth . . . definitions” of the terms “fiduci-
ary holdings” and “interlocking directorates.”130  Definitions or clarifica-
tions were required of “lower levels of American manufacturers,”131
“public official,”132 “Nuclear freeze,”133 and “value.”134
ternatives, we have not found it necessary to reach the other bases for omission of
the supporting statement which you have presented.”).
129. See, e.g., Nuclear Data, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15403, at *3
(Mar. 28, 1980).
130. Genuine Parts Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 10994, at *14 (Mar.
3, 1976) (“There does, however, appear to be some basis for your opinion and the
opinion of your counsel that the terms ‘fiduciary holdings’ and ‘interlocking direc-
torates’ used in the proposal are vague in that they may, without precise defini-
tions thereof, be subject to varying interpretations by the company’s security
holders.  Accordingly, unless the proponent promptly expands the proposal to set
forth his definitions of those terms, this Division will not recommend any enforce-
ment action to the Commission if the proposal and related supporting statement
are omitted from the company’s proxy material.”).
131. See, e.g., Rogers Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286165, at *2
(Feb. 21, 1990) (“There appears to be some basis for your view that the assertion in
the supporting statement that the Company’s ‘pre-tax earnings—measured against
sales or equity—fluctuated at the lower levels of American manufacturers,’ may be
omitted under Rule 14a-8(c)(3) on the basis that its imprecision may be mislead-
ing.  It appears, however, that this defect could be cured if the proponent revises
the supporting statement to define the ‘lower levels of American manufacturers’ so
that shareholders will be able to assess the intended comparison.  Assuming the
proponent revises the statement in the foregoing manner within seven calendar
days of receipt of this response, the Company may not omit it from its proxy
material.”).
132. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL
15155, at *3 (July 29, 1977) (“There appears to be some basis for your opinion that
parts of the proposal may be vague or indefinite in their present form, and should,
therefore, be clarified by the proponent.  Specifically, the term ‘public official’ is
not defined therein . . . .”).
133. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 29879, at
*2 (Mar. 17, 1983) (“There appears to be some basis for counsel’s opinion that the
second paragraph of the proposal is vague and ambiguous in violation of Rule 14a-
8(c)(3) unless the term ‘Nuclear Freeze’ is defined therein.  [Proponent], in his
March 10, 1983 letter on the matter, has indicated the Proponents willingness to
provide the definition in the proposal.  Assuming the proposal is promptly
amended in the manner indicated, we do not believe that management may omit
the second paragraph of the proposal.”).
134. See, e.g., 3D Sys. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 193422, at *1
(Apr. 6, 1999) (“[T]here appears to be some basis for your view that a portion of
the proposal may be vague and indefinite.  In our view, the term ‘value’ regarding
the 5% increase in the value of 3D common stock should be defined.  Accordingly,
unless the proponent provides 3D with a proposal revised in this manner, within
seven calendar days after receiving this letter, we will not recommend enforcement
action to the Commission if 3D omits the proposal from its proxy materials in
reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).”).
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Similarly, revisions were permitted with respect to the use of external
standards.  In Diamond Rock Corp.,135 for example, the shareholder propo-
sal referred to the Sullivan Principles, standards applicable to companies
with investments in South Africa.  The company asserted that the stan-
dards generated “considerable uncertainty” and that, as a result of the ref-
erence, shareholders “could not possibly know precisely what they were
being asked to approve.”136  The proponent, however, received the right
to add a summary of “the provisions of the Sullivan Principles” in the sup-
porting statement.137  Similarly, references to the “2003 NIS Social Rating
of socially responsible mutual funds” could be included but only if clari-
fied and summarized.138
The elimination of the right to cure changed the approach.  Terms or
phrases identified as “vague and indefinite” generally resulted in exclusion
without a right to revise.139  Unexplained conflicts with another bylaw pro-
135. SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65223 (Feb. 6, 1986).
136. See id. at *3 (“Under the circumstances, the Company’s stockholders
could not possibly know precisely what they were being asked to approve as a ‘re-
quest’ to the Company’s Board of Directors—and, if such a request were made by
the stockholders, the Company could not know what it was being asked to agree to
or to perform.  For these reasons, the Company believes that the UMC statement
quoted above is materially incomplete and, as a result, misleading within the mean-
ing of Rule 14a-9.”).
137. See id. at *1 (“There appears to be some basis for your view that the
proposal may be vague, and therefore misleading, in that it fails to delineate the
provisions of the Sullivan Principles.  However, it appears that this defect could be
cured if the proposal were revised to describe or summarize the provisions of the
Sullivan Principles.  Assuming the proponent promptly amends the proposal in
the manner indicated, we do not believe that the Company may rely on Rule 14a-
8(c)(3) as a basis for omitting the proposal and supporting statement in their en-
tirety from its proxy material.”).
138. See Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 23306671,
at *1, 6 (Sept. 25, 2003) (proponent should “clarify what NIS is” and should “sum-
marize how the NIS rating is determined”); see also Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
2002 WL 523418, at *1 (Mar. 8, 2002) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal
requesting the implementation of a policy consistent with the “Voluntary Princi-
ples on Security and Human Rights,” where the proposal failed to adequately sum-
marize the external standard despite referring to some, but not all, of the
standard’s provisions).
139. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 WL 5930441 (Oct.
7, 2016) (“There appears to be some basis for your view that Microsoft may ex-
clude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(3), as vague and indefinite.  We note in
particular your view that, in applying this particular proposal to Microsoft, neither
shareholders nor the company would be able to determine with any reasonable
certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires.”); Amphenol
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 1348940, at *4 (Mar. 28, 2014) (“Here, the
Proposal is impermissibly vague and indefinite so as to be inherently misleading
because, among other things, the Proposal is internally inconsistent and does not
sufficiently explain when the requested policy would apply.”); Berkshire Hathaway
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6859125, at *1 (Jan. 31, 2012) (proposal
requesting “that the CEO, other top officials and the Board of Directors be re-
quired to sign-off be[sic] means of an electronic key, daily or weekly, that they
have observed and approve or disapprove of figures and policies that show a high
risk condition for the company, caused by those policies” considered “vague and
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vision resulted in a finding of vague and indefinite without the right to
cure.140  The exclusion applied to proposals relating to special meet-
ings,141 the acceleration of unvested equity awards,142 compliance con-
trols for violations, or the separation of chair and CEO.143
indefinite” for “not sufficiently explain[ing] the meaning of ‘electronic key’ or
‘figures and policies’” without right to cure).
140. See, e.g., Staples, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 364041, at *1 (Apr.
13, 2012) (“The proposal does not address the conflict between these two provi-
sions of Staples’ bylaws.”); Wells Fargo & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL
6935318, at *1 (Mar. 7, 2012) (proposal seeking to amend bylaws to require inclu-
sion in proxy materials of “certain disclosures and statements, of any person nomi-
nated for election to the board by a shareholder or group of shareholders who
beneficially owned 1% or more” of company’s common stock considered “vague
and indefinite” for failing to “address the conflict between” another provision in
the bylaws with no right to cure).
141. See, e.g., United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL
380439, at *1 (Mar. 8, 2012) (describing proposal asking board “to take the steps
necessary unilaterally (to the fullest extent permitted by law) to . . . enable one or
more holders of not less than one-tenth of the company’s voting power (or the
lowest percentage of outstanding common stock permitted by state law) to call a
special meeting” considered vague and indefinite without right to cure); Yahoo!
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 478081, at *1 (Mar. 8, 2012) (proposal asking
board “to take the steps necessary unilaterally (to the fullest extent permitted by
law) to . . . enable one or more holders of not less than one-tenth of the company’s
voting power (or the lowest percentage of outstanding common stock permitted by
state law) to call a special meeting” considered vague and indefinite without right
to cure).
142. See, e.g., Devon Energy Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 160564, at
*1 (Mar. 1, 2012) (proposal urging board to adopt policy “that in the event of a
senior executive’s termination or a change of control, there shall be no accelera-
tion in the vesting of any equity awards to senior executives, except that any un-
vested equity awards may vest on a pro rata basis.  To the extent any such unvested
equity awards are based on performance, the performance goals must be met”
considered to be “vague and indefinite” without the right to cure); Ltd. Brands,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 249848, at *1 (Feb. 29, 2012) (proposal urg-
ing board to adopt policy “that in the event of a change of control, there shall be
no acceleration in the vesting of any equity awards to senior executives, provided
that any unvested award may vest on a pro rata basis up to the time of a change of
control event” considered to be “vague and indefinite” with no right to cure); Ver-
izon Commc’ns Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6837541, at *1 (Jan. 27,
2012) (proposal urging board to adopt policy “that in the event of a senior execu-
tive’s termination or a change-in-control, there shall be no acceleration in the vest-
ing of any equity awards to senior executives, except that any unvested equity
awards may vest on a pro rata basis that is proportionate to the executive’s length
of employment during the vesting period” considered to be “vague and indefinite”
with no right to cure).
143. See, e.g., ConocoPhillips, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 122330, at *1
(Mar. 13, 2012) (proposal recommending that board “commission an audit of the
compliance controls failing to prevent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations by
the board chairman” could be omitted under subsection (i)(3) without right to
cure).
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B. “Four Corners” Analysis and the Expansion of “Vague and Indefinite”
1. Four Corners
The elimination of the right to cure after 2004 coincided with a
change in the approach used to define proposals treated as vague.144  Ini-
tially, the standard applied where the proposal made “it impossible for
either the board of directors or the stockholders at large to comprehend
precisely what the proposal would entail.”145 “Reasonable certainty” even-
tually replaced impossibility, extending the exclusion to proposals that did
not necessarily qualify as misleading.146
The nexus to the antifraud provisions further weakened with the deci-
sion to determine vagueness on the basis of the four corners of the propo-
sal and supporting statement.147  The interpretation diverged from the
traditional approach used under Rule 14a-9.  In assessing the materiality
of a statement, the antifraud provision looked to the “total mix” of availa-
ble information.  Total mix included matters appearing elsewhere in the
proxy materials or otherwise commonly known to shareholders.148  The
144. See Dyer v. SEC, 287 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1961) (holding that the SEC
did not act arbitrarily by requiring exclusion of a shareholder proposal).  In fact,
the proposal was submitted to shareholders the following year. See id.  (“As a mat-
ter of fact, when petitioners repeated the request the following year, to have the
proposal included in management’s proxy statement for that stockholders meet-
ing, management decided to let this be done, presumably to enable it to get rid of
the question; and the resolution was duly submitted and defeated.”).
145. See id. at 781.
146. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 81,122, 1977 WL 11653, at *6 (Feb. 8, 1977); see also Coca-Cola Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1977 WL 11671, at *5 (Feb. 24, 1977) (finding “some basis” for the
opinion that the proposal was “so inherently vague and indefinite that the share-
holders voting upon the proposal would not be able” to determine with “any rea-
sonable certainty exactly what action” would be taken “in the event the proposal
were implemented”); Xerox Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 12825, at *7
(Mar. 10, 1977) (“the Division concurs in your view that the action requested by
the proposal is so inherently vague and indefinite that the shareholders voting
upon the proposal would not be able to determine with any reasonable certainty
exactly what action or measures the Company would take in the event the proposal
were implemented.  Consequently, we believe that the proposal may be mislead-
ing, in that, any action ultimately taken by the Company upon the implementation
of the proposal could be quite different from the type of action envisioned by the
shareholders at the time their votes were cast.”).
147. See Div. of Corp. Fin., Shareholder Proposals, SEC Staff Legal Bulletin
No. 14G (Oct, 16, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14g.htm [https:/
/perma.cc/A8TK-NM53] (“In evaluating whether a proposal may be excluded on
this basis [vague and indefinite], we consider only the information contained in
the proposal and supporting statement and determine whether, based on that in-
formation, shareholders and the company can determine what actions the propo-
sal seeks.”).
148. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  The
total mix did not include information in other reports filed with the Commission.
Information in the annual report to shareholders, however, posed a closer ques-
tion. See, e.g., United Paper Workers Int’l Union v. Int’l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190,
1200 (2d Cir. 1993) (“On the other hand, given the unqualifiedly glowing state-
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interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(3), however, limited the analysis mostly to
the language of the proposal and the supporting statement.
The shift meant that almost any proposal became subject to challenge
as “vague and indefinite.”  Given the word limit,149 proposals and their
supporting statements rarely had the space to thoroughly define all terms
or completely summarize every standard.150  Use of a well-known or easily
available external standards saved space but also rendered the proposal
subject to challenge.
References to a staff legal bulletin151 or the requirements of Rule 14a-
8 resulted in exclusion, without a right to revise.152  So did reliance on
external definitions of independent director.  In one case, the no-action
letter permitted exclusion where the proposal relied on a definition devel-
oped by the Council of Institutional Investors.153
ments that were actually made in the Proxy Statement, we consider it a close ques-
tion whether such disclosures made in the annual report should be deemed part of
the total mix available to shareholders or should instead be deemed buried in a
part of the report where one seeking environmental information might not think
to look.”).
149. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2017).
150. In one series, the no-action letter agreed that a reference to “nontrivial”
amounts of stock was vague and indefinite, see Pfizer, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
2014 WL 7171636, at *4 (Mar. 10, 2015) (“There appears to be some basis for your
view that Pfizer may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(3), as vague and
indefinite.  We note in particular your view that, in applying this particular propo-
sal to Pfizer, neither shareholders nor the company would be able to determine
with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal re-
quires.”). But see McGraw Hill Fin., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 412926,
at *1 (Feb. 26, 2015) (“Although the staff has previously agreed that there is some
basis for your view, upon further reflection, we are unable to conclude that the
proposal, taken as a whole, is so vague or indefinite that it is rendered materially
misleading.”).
151. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 6999590, at *1,
15 (Jan. 15, 2015) (proposal requesting that the board “establish a rule” that sepa-
rated the chair and CEO, the supporting statement noted that “[t]his proposal
gives our company an opportunity to follow SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14C to cure a
Chairman’s non-independence” (internal quotations omitted)).
152. See, e.g., Dell, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 1615814, at *1 (Mar.
30, 2012) (standard of “SEC Rule 14a-8(b) eligibility requirements” considered
vague and indefinite (internal quotations omitted)).  As the no-action letter noted:
“While we recognize that some shareholders voting on the proposal may be famil-
iar with the eligibility requirements of rule 14a-8(b), many other shareholders may
not be familiar with the requirements and would not be able to determine the
requirements based on the language of the proposal.” Id.
153. See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 851469, at
*1 (Feb. 3, 2009) (proposal excluded where proposal “provide[d] that the stan-
dard of independence would be the standard set by the Council of Institutional
Investors which is simply an independent director is a person whose directorship
constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation”); Boeing Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2004 WL 315205, at *1 (Feb. 10, 2004) (“The proposal requests that
Boeing amend its bylaws to require that an independent director, as defined by the
Council of Intuitional Investors, shall serve as chairman of the board of directors.
There appears to be some basis for your view that Boeing may exclude the propo-
sal under rule 14a-8(i)(3) as vague and indefinite . . . .”).
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In Chevron Corp.,154 the issuer succeeded in obtaining exclusion of a
proposal that referenced the definition of independent director that ap-
peared in the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Shareholders submitted a proposal calling for the separation of chair and
CEO.  The chair was to be an “independent director according to the defi-
nition set forth in the New York stock exchange standards.”155  The defini-
tion used by the NYSE consisted of around 1300 words, far in excess of the
limit for proposals under in Rule 14a-8.156
The reference to the NYSE standard rendered the proposal “vague
and indefinite.”  As the no-action letter explained:
[W]e note that the proposal refers to the “New York Stock Ex-
change listing standards” for the definition of an “independent
director,” but does not provide information about what this defi-
nition means.  In our view, this definition is a central aspect of
the proposal.  As we indicated in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G
(Oct. 16, 2012), we believe that a proposal would be subject to
exclusion under rule 14a-8(i)(3) if neither the shareholders vot-
ing on the proposal, nor the company in implementing the pro-
posal (if adopted), would be able to determine with reasonable
certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires.
In evaluating whether a proposal may be excluded on this basis,
we consider only the information contained in the proposal and
supporting statement and determine whether, based on that in-
formation, shareholders and the company can determine what
actions the proposal seeks.157
154. SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 207026 (Mar. 15, 2013).
155. Id. at *14.  The resolution provided that:
[S]hareholders of Chevron . . . ask the Board of Directors to adopt a
policy that the Board’s Chair be an independent director according to
the definition set forth in the New York Stock Exchange standards, unless
Chevron common stock ceases being listed there and is listed on another
exchange, at which point, that exchange’s standards should apply.
Id.  The shareholder submitted a revised version providing that “shareholders of
Chevron . . . ask the Board of Directors to adopt a policy that the Board’s Chair be
an independent director (by the standard of the New York Stock Exchange), who has not
previously served as an executive officer of the Company.” Id. at *7 (emphasis in origi-
nal).  The no-action letter apparently considered only the first version.
156. The NYSE definition consists of around 1300 words. See N.Y.S.E. LISTED
CO. MANUAL § 303A.02, 2003 WL 2373121 (2013).
157. Chevron Corp., 2013 WL 207026, at *1.  The Commission had excluded a
number of similar proposals the prior year without specifying the reason. See, e.g.,
Clorox Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 2867781, at *2 (Aug. 13, 2012) (pro-
posal “provid[ing] that the chairman shall be a director who is independent from
the company, as defined in the New York Stock Exchange listing standards” consid-
ered “vague and indefinite” without right to cure); WellPoint, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2012 WL 167230, at *1 (Feb. 24, 2012) (proposal requesting “that the
board adopt a policy that the chairman shall be an independent director accord-
ing to the definition set forth in the New York Stock Exchange listing standards”
considered “vague and indefinite” without right to cure); Mattel, Inc., SEC No-
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In addition to sidestepping the widespread nature of the standard,
the position failed to take into account the discussion in the standard else-
where in the company’s proxy materials.  Because the issuer traded on
that exchange, the proxy statement repeatedly referenced the definition
used by the NYSE.158  The approach likewise declined to take into account
explanatory comments in management’s opposition statement.159  Nor
was the standard apparently applied to disclosure by the issuer in the same
proxy statement.160
Action Letter, 2011 WL 6837543, at *1 (Feb. 9, 2012) (“proposal request[ing] that
the board adopt a policy that, whenever possible, the chairman shall be an inde-
pendent director, by the standard of the New York Stock Exchange, who has not
previously served as an executive officer of Mattel” considered “vague and indefi-
nite” without right to cure).
158. As the Chevron proxy statement noted, “[t]he Board has determined
that each nonemployee Director who served in 2012 and each current nonem-
ployee Director is independent in accordance with the NYSE Corporate Govern-
ance Standards and that no material relationship exists that would interfere with
the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a Di-
rector.” CHEVRON CORP., 2013 PROXY STATEMENT 11, 16, 24, 28 (2012), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000130817913000196/
lchevron_def14a.htm [https://perma.cc/MP8A-ZT6M].  The proxy statement
noted that directors were required to be independent in accordance with the
NYSE Corporate Governance Standards. See id. at 11. (“and that no material rela-
tionship exists that would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment”).
Rather than explain the test, the proxy statement simply noted that “the Board
adheres to the specific tests for independence included in the NYSE Corporate
Governance Standards.” Id.; see also id. at 21 (“The Committee is composed en-
tirely of independent Directors as defined by the NYSE Corporate Governance
Standards and operates under a written charter.”).  The proxy statement had not
yet been filed when the no action request was considered.  Nonetheless, the prior
year’s statement included references to the independence standard employed by
the NYSE and could reasonably be expected to repeat the discussion. See CHEVRON
CORP., 2012 PROXY STATEMENT 8 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/93410/000119312512160701/d304761ddef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/
UZ6J-PN6E].
159. The statement provided an opportunity to address unclear or allegedly
incorrect statements. See Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL
30878, at *2 (Mar. 7, 1983) (“[T]his Division does not concur that the proposal is
false and misleading in violation of Rule 14a-8(c)(3) because shareholders will be
confused regarding the date fixed for the 1983 meeting.  If management contin-
ues to believe that such confusion will result, it could, in our view, clarify this point
in its own statement in opposition.”); see also NLT Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1982 WL 28881, at *2 (Feb. 16, 1982) (“With respect to the applicability of
Rule 14a-8(c)(3) to the proposal and the balance of the supporting statement, this
Division is unable to concur in counsel’s opinion that the proposal omits to state
material facts or that the supporting statement is otherwise misleading.  In the
event that management continues to believe that the proposal and supporting
statement is confusing and raise improper implications, it could, in our view, effec-
tively eliminate them in its own statement on the proposal.”).  Management must
share the opposition statement with the proponent prior to the distribution of
proxy materials. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m)(3) (2017).
160. Shareholders were allowed to object to false and misleading information
in the opposition statement used by the issuer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(m)(2).
The provision, however, has essentially been unenforced. See, e.g., Hinz, supra note
6, at 223.  Subsequent no-action letters apparently took the opposite view, allowing
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2. Hyperlinks Foreclosed
Hyperlinks represented a possible solution.161  Shareholders could in-
clude URLs in their proposals that linked to appropriate definitions.
Nonetheless, the approach was also foreclosed.  Content on the Internet
could be used to exclude162 but not augment163 a proposal.
The ban on the use of hyperlinks to supply missing definitions stood
in contrast to the increased expectation that investors would access materi-
als electronically.  Proxy statements164 and annual reports were increas-
the inclusion of a proposal that referenced the NYSE standards for independence.
See Sears Holding Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 6629373, at *1 (Feb. 9,
2018) (finding that proposal calling for board chair to be held by an independent
director “as defined in accordance with applicable requirements of the NYSE” was
not “so vague or indefinite that it is rendered materially misleading”).
161. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, supra note 15, at 14 (“Because we
count a website address as one word for purposes of the 500-word limitation, we do
not believe that a website address raises the concern that rule 14a-8(d) is intended
to address.”); see also McKesson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 2407163, at
*27 (May 31, 2013) (“[W]e believe that a proposal would be subject to exclusion
under rule 14a-8(i)(3) if neither the shareholders voting on the proposal, nor the
company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine
with reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires.
In evaluating whether a proposal may be excluded on this basis, we consider only
the information contained in the proposal and supporting statement and deter-
mine whether, based on that information, shareholders and the company can de-
termine what actions the proposal seeks.” (emphasis added)).
162. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, supra note 15, at 22 (“In some cir-
cumstances, we may concur in a company’s view that it may exclude a website
address under rule 14a-8(i)(3) because information contained on the website may
be materially false or misleading, irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or
otherwise in contravention of the proxy rules.  Companies seeking to exclude a
website address under rule 14a-8(i)(3) should specifically indicate why they believe
information contained on the particular website is materially false or misleading,
irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of
the proxy rules.”); see also SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G, supra note 145 (“To
the extent that the company seeks the exclusion of a website reference in a propo-
sal, but not the proposal itself, we will continue to follow the guidance stated in
SLB No. 14, which provides that references to website addresses in proposals or
supporting statements could be subject to exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) if the
information contained on the website is materially false or misleading, irrelevant
to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of the proxy
rules, including Rule 14a-9.”).
163. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G, supra note 147 (“If a proposal or
supporting statement refers to a website that provides information necessary for
shareholders and the company to understand with reasonable certainty exactly
what actions or measures the proposal requires, and such information is not also
contained in the proposal or in the supporting statement, then we believe the
proposal would raise concerns under Rule 14a-9 and would be subject to exclusion
under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as vague and indefinite.”).
164. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2017).  Shareholders can still request hard
copies and companies can opt to mail hard copies.  Nonetheless, the use of hard
copies has continued to decline. See, e.g., BROADRIDGE & PWC, PROXYPULSE: 2017
PROXY SEASON PREVIEW 4 (2017), http://proxypulse.broadridge.com/proxypulse/
_assets/docs/broadridge-2017-proxy-season-preview.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MJZ-
ZCG2] (“For the first time, over 50% of retail investors chose to receive their proxy
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ingly online.165  The Commission required the inclusion of links in SEC
filings to exhibits.166  With respect to social media, the Commission has
permitted hyperlinks to be used in place of required legends, presuming
that investors would have access to the Internet.167  Proposed rule changes
would allow the use of hyperlinks in SEC filings to other documents filed
in EDGAR.168
Moreover, issuers commonly included hyperlinks in proxy statements.
The Chevron proxy statement at issue in the no-action letter concerning
independent directors provided for links to the ethics code169 and policies
regarding social responsibility.170  A URL appeared in the opposition
materials electronically during this mini-season—a 9 percentage point increase
over the same period last year.”).
165. See Division of Corporate Finance Guidance: Proxy Rules and Schedule 14A (Re-
garding Submission of Annual Reports to SEC Under Rules 14a-3(c) and 14c-3(b)), U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/gui
dance/exchange-act-rule-14a3-14c3.htm [https://perma.cc/S4HC-DGE5] (“The
Division will not object if a company posts an electronic version of its annual re-
port to its corporate web site by the dates specified in Rule 14a-3(c), Rule 14c-3(b)
and Form 10-K respectively, in lieu of mailing paper copies or submitting it on
EDGAR.  If the report remains accessible for at least one year after posting, the
staff will consider it available for its information.”).
166. See Exhibit Hyperlinks and HTML Format, Exchange Act Release No.
10322, 2017 WL 839489, at *1 (Mar. 1, 2017) (noting that proposals “were in-
tended to facilitate easier access to these exhibits for investors and other users of
the information”).
167. See Securities Act Rules: Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/
securitiesactrules-interps.htm [https://perma.cc/6Q33-M6PH]; see also Exemp-
tions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 10238, 2016 WL 6872611, at *9 (Oct. 26, 2016) (“To accommodate
space-constrained social media communication, when offering materials are dis-
tributed through a communications medium that has technological limitations on
the number of characters or amount of text that may be included in the communi-
cation and including the required statements in their entirety, together with the
other information, would cause the communication to exceed the limit on the
number of characters or amount of text, an issuer could satisfy the disclosure re-
quirement by including an active hyperlink to the required disclosure that other-
wise would be required by the rules.”).
168. See Fast Act Modernization and Simplification of Regulation S-K, Ex-
change Act Release No. 81851, 2017 WL 4548274, at *89 (Oct. 11, 2017) (“Consis-
tent with the recommendation of commenters and the staff, we are proposing to
facilitate greater investor access to disclosure by amending Rule 411, Rule 12b-23,
and Rule 0-4 to require hyperlinks to information that is incorporated by reference
if that information is available on EDGAR.”).
169. See CHEVRON CORP., 2013 PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 158, at 20 (“We
have adopted a code of business conduct and ethics for Directors, officers (includ-
ing the Company’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Comptrol-
ler) and employees, known as the Business Conduct and Ethics Code.  The code is
available on our website at www.chevron.com and is available in print upon
request.”).
170. See id. at 70 (“Many of the issues included in the following stockholder
proposals are discussed in Chevron’s Corporate Responsibility Report, our Annual
Report and this Proxy Statement.  Additional information on Chevron’s corporate
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statement.171  The proxy statement contained more than twenty refer-
ences to material located at the company’s website.172
3. Consequences
The approach in some ways favored proposals without references to
external standards or definitions.  In Comcast Corp.,173 the shareholder
submitted a proposal requesting “that the board adopt a policy . . . to
require” that the chair “be an independent” director.174  The company
objected, noting that the proposal “fail[ed] to provide any definition for
that critical concept.”175  The staff, however, was “unable to conclude”
that the proposal was “so inherently vague or indefinite” and therefore
subject to exclusion.176  Thus, a proposal that referred to a specific and
widely known standard (the NYSE definition of independence) was con-
sidered vague while one that referenced no standard at all was considered
sufficiently concrete.
C. Images
As the 2004 staff bulletin noted, the exclusion also extended to pro-
posals with language deemed “irrelevant.”  Despite the goal of narrowing
the application of subsection (i)(3), the concept of irrelevancy expanded
over time to address the use of tables and images.  The standard was, how-
ever, used to edit proposals rather than exclude them entirely.
Graphs, charts, and tables in proxy statements generally benefited in-
vestors177 and their inclusion had been encouraged.178  Nonetheless, Rule
governance and corporate social responsibility philosophies and initiatives is avail-
able on our website at www.chevron.com.”).
171. See id. at 71 (“Some of this year’s stockholder proposals refer to the Ecua-
dor litigation involving the Company. . . . Chevron has provided substantial infor-
mation on these matters in our required and voluntary disclosures, including
Chevron’s quarterly and annual SEC reports and on our website.  At
www.chevron.com/ecuador, stockholders and the public can find background materi-
als, press releases, media articles, legal filings, scientific reports, videos and other
information.  We encourage all stockholders to familiarize themselves with these
materials.”); see also id. at 73, 74–75, 79, 81, 82, 85, 87, 89 (featuring other URL
links).
172. The proxy statement included twenty-four references that contained the
stem, “www.chevron.com.” See id.
173. SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 WL 521265 (Feb. 8, 2016).
174. See id. at *1.
175. See id. at *5.
176. See id. at *1.
177. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITER-
ACY AMONG INVESTORS iv (Aug. 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/
917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG4U-ZG7N] (“With re-
spect to the format of disclosure documents, investors prefer that disclosures be
written in clear, concise, understandable language, using bullet points, tables,
charts, and/or graphs.”).
178. Encouragement to use tables and other visual aids was not limited to the
proxy process. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion
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14a-8 did not specifically address the right of shareholders to add non-
textual materials such as pictures and tables to their proposals.  Such addi-
tions could take up additional space in the proxy statement.  Moreover,
efforts by issuers to reduce the size of the images could interfere with the
obligation to ensure that matters were “clearly presented”179 or printed in
at least 10-point type.180
Traditionally, the word limit in the rule represented the primary
source of regulation for this type of content.  In Ferrofluidics Corp.,181 an
executive compensation proposal included a graph.  The company sought
exclusion, arguing that, based upon the amount of space, the proposal
exceeded the equivalent of 500 words.  The no-action letter declined to
accept the postion,182 noting that the rule “only impose[d] a limitation on
the number of words, and provide[d] no basis for equating graphic
presentations to words.”183  The words and numbers used in the chart,
however, counted against the word limit.184
The approach left a number of issues unaddressed.  In particular, pic-
tures and other images took up space but did not necessarily implicate the
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 8350, 2003 WL 22996757, at *6 (Dec. 19, 2003) (“Companies should
consider whether a tabular presentation of relevant financial or other information
may help a reader’s understanding of MD&A.  For example, a company’s MD&A
might be clearer and more concise if it provides a tabular comparison of its results
in different periods, which could include line items and percentage changes as
well as other information determined by a company to be useful, followed by a
narrative discussion and analysis of known changes, events, trends, uncertainties
and other matters.”).
179. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-5(a) (2017).
180. Only footnotes can use smaller type. See id. § 240.14a-5(d)(1) (“All
printed proxy statements shall be in roman type at least as large and as legible as
10-point modern type, except that to the extent necessary for convenient presenta-
tion financial statements and other tabular data, but not the notes thereto, may be
in roman type at least as large and as legible as 8-point modern type.  All such type
shall be leaded at least 2 points.”); see also Part 230—General Rules and Regula-
tions, Securities Act of 1933 Part 240—General Rules and Regulations, Securities
Exchange Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 9151, 1971 WL 126067, at *1
(Apr. 30, 1971) (“The amendments provide that notes to financial statements and
other tabular data shall be set forth in 10-point type, which is the size of type
prescribed for the body of prospectuses, proxy statements and other documents
filed with the Commission or sent to security holders.”).
181. SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 235093 (Sept. 18, 1992).
182. See id. at *2 (“The Proposal may also violate Rule 14a-8(b)(1) in that it
contains a graph which in size, when combined with the text of the Proposal and
Supporting Statement, appears to exceed the 500-word limit contained in that
Rule.”).
183. Id. at *1.
184. See also Aetna Life & Cas. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 18740, at
*1 (Jan. 18, 1995) (proposal exceeded 500 words and could be excluded where it
included a table that, if each numerical entry in the table were counted as a word,
the total would exceed 500); Am. Express Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL
18745, at *6 (Jan. 18, 1995) (exclusion permitted for exceeding 500 words where
company argued that by, “[i]ncluding the numbers in these graphs as one word
each, the proposal contains over 650 words”).
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word count.  A no-action letter to General Electric, however, extended
subsection (i)(3) to these materials.
The proposal addressed cumulative voting.  The supporting state-
ment asserted that the authority “may serve to better align shareholder
performance to CEO performance” and referenced an “image.”185  The
image contained a series of charts titled “Debt/Earnings (DE) Study: GE,
JNJ, AAPL” and stating that “Debt Driven Volatility Hurts Shareholders,
yet Enriches the CEO who ‘wisely’ trades.”186  The charts included emojis
consisting of smiling or frowning faces.
The no-action letter issued by the Commission initially declined to
permit omission, finding that the presence of the images did not cause the
proposal to exceed 500 words.187  The company sought Commission re-
view,188 emphasizing the complexity of the issue.
The issues presented by the prospect of including images within
shareowner proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 are novel and
highly complex.  The most fundamental issue—how to reconcile
a “500 word” limitation with the use of an image—itself is novel.
Moreover, the use of images within shareowner proposals raises
complex issues such as whether a shareowner can force a com-
pany to incur the expense of printing the image in color if such
is necessary for the image to be understandable, how to resolve
potential copyright or privacy claims over use of an image, and
how to assess whether an image is false or misleading.189
A footnote also asserted that the images had no clear relationship with the
proposal and were therefore misleading.190
185. See Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 WL 7370133, at *4 (Feb.
3, 2017).
186. The graph can be found at page 52 of the original no-action request. See
Gen. Elec., SEC No-Action Letter, at 52 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divi
sions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2017/martinharangozo020317-14a8.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/5G6M-8MPL].
187. See Gen. Elec., 2016 WL 7370133, at *22.
188. Although the response noted that requests for Commission review could
be presented for “matters of substantial importance and where the issues are novel
or highly complex,” the issue apparently did not meet that standard. See Gen.
Elec., SEC No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 821664, at *1 (Feb. 23, 2017); see also 17
C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (2017).  The response came an associate director of the division.
See Gen. Elec., 2017 WL 821664, at *1 (letter from staff signed by Associate Director,
Legal).
189. Id. at *6.
190. See id. at *9 n.9 (“In addition to the Images being vague and misleading
when presented in the formatted equivalent space of 500 words, the Images also
are misleading because they have no clear relationship to the subject matter of the
Proposal.  Therefore, we respectfully believe that the Proposal also is properly ex-
cludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3).”).
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The Commission did not review the matter but the staff reconsidered
and permitted exclusion.191  Describing the visual as “a page of images,
including detailed charts, graphs, equations, and emoji,” the no-action let-
ter characterized the challenged material as “irrelevant,” resulting in “a
strong likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would be uncertain as to
the matter on which he or she is being asked to vote.”192
Although relying on subsection (i)(3), the table arguably did not
qualify as false and misleading.  The 2004 bulletin allowed for exclusion
on the basis of irrelevancy but only where the material encompassed a
“substantial portion[ ] of the supporting statement” and created a “strong
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would be uncertain as to the mat-
ter on which she is being asked to vote.”193  The image at issue in the
General Electric letter did not appear to implicate either issue.
The use of a single no-action letter to exclude tables raised the spec-
ter of another encrypted interpretation.194  Neither the letter in General
Electric nor a subsequent staff bulletin provided any significant guidance
on the use of irrelevancy to regulate tables, charts and images.  Only
through application would the full extent of the interpretation become
known.
V. ADDRESSING THE USE OF ENCRYPTED INTERPRETATIONS
An understanding of Rule 14a-8 requires resort to a significant body
of administrative interpretations.  The no-action letter process and the
role of the staff as “informal arbiters” of disputes between issuers and pro-
ponents constitute a widely accepted approach.195  Efforts to significantly
191. See id. at *9.  The company did argue that a reduction in the size of the
images could render them “so small that they [would] not be meaningful, and in
fact could be misleading.” See id.  The company did not, however, assert that they
were irrelevant and therefore misleading. See id.
192. Id. at *1, 4 (“Although we are unable to concur in your view that the
proposal as a whole may be excluded, there appears to be some basis for your view
that GE may exclude the Images (as defined in your February 13, 2017 letter)
under rule 14a-8(i)(3).  In our view, the Images are irrelevant to a consideration of
the subject matter of the proposal, such that there is a strong likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would be uncertain as to the matter on which he or she is
being asked to vote.  Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to
the Commission if GE omits the Images from its proxy materials in reliance on rule
14a-8(i)(3).”).
193. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B, supra note 17.
194. Subsequent no-action letters suggest that the “irrelevancy” prong of sub-
section (i)(3) become a tool used to edit proposals, suggesting a return to the
approach used prior to the 2004 Bulletin. See Kroger Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
2017 WL 697559, at *1 (Mar. 27, 2017) (authorizing company to omit portion of
proposal relating to neonics as “irrelevant”).
195. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 39093, 1997 WL 578696, at *4 (Sept. 18, 1997) (noting that the Commis-
sion and staff play “the role of informal arbiter between companies and
shareholders submitting a growing variety of shareholder proposals”); see also A. A.
Sommer, Jr., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,  Washington, D.C., Delivered in Lisbon,
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reduce or eliminate this role has, at least historically, been opposed.196  As
a result, no-action letters interpreting the requirements of Rule 14a-8 will
remain an established part of the process.
Administrative interpretations are typically developed in a non-trans-
parent fashion through a process that does not necessarily involve input
from interested parties.197  Moreover, shifts in viewpoint can be abrupt.198
The lack of input can result in an approach inconsistent with the language
or intent of the rule.199
In addition, articulation of these interpretations in an encrypted fash-
ion adds uncertainty to the shareholder proposal process.  With adminis-
trative positions disclosed only through application, their boundaries will
often remain unclear. Proponents cannot fully take them into account
when drafting proposals.  Issuers may have an incentive to probe the
boundaries of the position through the no-action process.
The lack of transparency also makes challenges to administrative posi-
tions more difficult.  Parties can appeal rulings in no-action letters.200  Ap-
peals, however, are generally limited to “matters of substantial
importance” or those involving issues deemed “novel or highly com-
Portugal: The Regulation of Securities Markets in the United States 13 (May 1983),
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rack
cdn.com/collection/papers/1980/1983_0501_Sommer_Reg_US.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9ZDV-LKRF] (“As you may well guess, there is frequently controversy
between proponents and issuers about these matters, and again the Commission
acts as an informal arbiter.”).
196. See, e.g., Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act
Release No. 23200, 1998 WL 254809, at *5 (May 21, 1998).
197. In one anomalous situation, the Commission sought comment before
altering an administrative interpretation under Rule 14a-8.  This occurred in con-
nection with the interpretation of the exclusion in subsection (i)(9) for substan-
tially identical proposals. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(9) (2017).  For a discussion
of the circumstances, see generally Brown, Evolving Role, supra note 9.
198. Viewpoints can shift with changes in leadership at the Commission. See
generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Essay: The Politicization of Corporate Governance: Bureau-
cratic Discretion, the SEC, and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
501 (2012) [hereinafter Brown, The Politicization of Corporate Governance].
199. An example of this occurred in connection with the interpretation of the
exclusion applicable to proposals that have been substantially implemented. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10).  In two letters applicable to special meeting proposals,
an interpretation was applied that was arguably inconsistent with the rule and, at a
minimum, did not comport with the obligation of the issuer to justify the use of
the exclusion. See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Comment Letter on Rule 14a-8(I)(10),
Securities & Exchange Commission (U. Denv. Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 15-26,
June 18, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620417
[https://perma.cc/C764-HK6W].  Similarly, the 2004 bulletin essentially con-
fessed fault when altering the interpretation of false and misleading under subsec-
tion (i)(3). See supra note 108.
200. For a discussion of the appeal and reconsideration process, see generally
Courtney E. Bartkus, Appealing No-Action Responses Under Rule 14a-8: Informal Proce-
dures of the SEC and the Availability of Meaningful Review, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE
199 (2016).
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plex.”201  Encryption may make it more difficulty for parties appealing a
ruling to show the full extent of the administrative position and establish
the requisite complexity.
Encryption has also, over time, become a more established part of the
shareholder proposal process.  No-action letters in the 1970s and 1980s
often explained in detail the reasons for applying a particular exclusion or
limitation.  By the new millennium, the letters did little more than agree
or disagree with one of the parties, making a precise understanding of the
administrative position difficult to discern.
The reduction in analysis appears not to have been a result of work
load.  The number of no-action requests have declined since the 1980s.202
In addition, letters raising novel issues or seeking a modification of ex-
isting positions presumably require an internal analysis to determine the
outcome.203  Thus, the administrative cost of developing a position should
largely be the same.  The letters therefore could reflect a policy decision
not to reveal internal analysis.
Accompanying the reduction in analysis has been a decline in direct
involvement by the Commission.  In earlier periods, Commission oversight
took place on a regular basis.  At least into the 1960s, the Commission
routinely reviewed and voted upon interpretations set out in no-action let-
ters under Rule 14a-8.204  In the 1970s and 1980s, administrative interpre-
tations were regularly submitted to the public for comment.
In later decades, however, this type of involvement largely ceased.
The instances where administrative interpretations have been articulated
by the Commission and submitted for comment have declined.  The rule
was rewritten in plain English in 1998 but for the most part not changed
201. Appeals are permitted upon recommendation by the staff for issues
deemed “complex” and “novel.” See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d).
202. In 2016, companies submitted 245 no-action requests (down from 318 in
2015). See Elizabeth Ising et al., Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016
Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN 12 (June 28, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publi
cations/Documents/Shareholder-Proposal-Developments-2016-Proxy-Season.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NUE-LKVB]; see also Shareholder Proposal Developments During
the 2017 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN 12 (June 29, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.
com/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2017-proxy-season/ [https://
perma.cc/R8BN-BCXU (noting that 288 no-action requests submitted during 2017
proxy season).  In 1983, companies filed 495 requests. See Memorandum from Bill
Morley, supra note 81, at 2 (noting 414 contested proposals in 1983, with 328 let-
ters issued by the Division and 495 contested proposals in 1982, with 315 letters
issued by the Division).
203. See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1029 (“In many cases the staff attorney will
meet with his supervisor to discuss the recommended response.  A proposed re-
sponse that involves a novel or significant issue may be reviewed on several levels
within the division or by the Commission itself before the response is issued.”).
204. See, e.g., Div. of Corp Fin., Summary of Interpretations, 1960–1964, http:
//3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.
com/collection/papers/1960/1960_1964_Interprt_Corp_Finance.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G2ZR-EQWR] (describing Commission action on no-action letters).
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substantively.205  Amendments adopted in 2010 altered one exclusion but
otherwise left the rule intact.206  As a result, changes in the reach and
meaning of the rule have mostly been left to the informal process set out
in no-action letters.207
The lack of transparent intervention does not mean that the positions
are inconsistent with Commission views or that the Commission has been
uninvolved in determining the boundaries of these interpretations.208
The Commission has the authority to overturn administrative determina-
tions.  That this does not occur with any regularity suggests that in fact
these views may already reflect the positions of at least a majority of the
Commission.209
The approach, therefore, lacks sufficient transparency and accounta-
bility.  Administrative positions are harder to attribute to the Commission
and more difficult to challenge, both administratively and legally.210  Rep-
205. See Brown, Evolving Role, supra note 9, at 152.
206. For a discussion of the amendment, see, e.g., Nicole L. Jones, Shareholder
Proposals, Director Elections, and Proxy Access: The History of the SEC’s Impediments to
Shareholder Franchise, 93 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 233, 237 (2016).
207. Thus, during the 2016 proxy season (defined as from Oct. 1, 2015
through June 1, 2016), shareholders of Russell 3000 companies submitted 916 pro-
posals, down from 943 the year before. See Ising et al., supra note 202, at 4.  Of that
number, issuers submitted 245 requests for no-action relief, with 239 receiving a
response. See id. at 12; see also Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Shareholder Rights, the 2008 Proxy Sea-
son, and the Impact of Shareholder Activism (July 22, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2008/spch072208psa.htm [https://perma.cc/8PMZ-98CY] (“Dur-
ing the 2007–2008 proxy season, our staff was incredibly busy.  We have received
426 no-action requests through July 15, an increase from the 367 received during
the prior year.  Of this number, 53 were withdrawn before the staff could respond.
Unsurprisingly, the staff agreed with the company approximately 75.7% of the
time.”).
208. The reduction in Commission intervention in the form of rule amend-
ments may in part be structural.  Rule amendments involve delay and can be easily
challenged, particularly as arbitrary and capricious.  The courts have sometimes
applied a very broad interpretation of this standard in invalidating Commission
rules. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  For
a discussion of the case, see generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Shareholder Access and




209. Given the increasingly political division of the Commission, the adminis-
trative positions more likely reflect the views of the chair of the Commission. See
Brown, The Politicization of Corporate Governance, supra note 198, at 503.  The chair
controls the agenda of meetings and, to the extent the chair seeks to overturn
administrative interpretation, the chair could raise a matter at any time.  To the
extent that other commissioners want to bring a matter to the full Commission
over a refusal by the chair to do so, they would presumably need a majority of the
commissioners in office to do so. See id. at 530 n.169.
210. Where review has occurred, courts have sometimes characterized the po-
sition as a “rule.”  Nonetheless, to the extent deemed interpretive, the rule does
not require notice and comment. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d
7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Under this sweeping definition, the Cracker Barrel no-action
38
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resenting “informal” positions,211 no-action letters are not generally
treated as final agency actions subject to review.212  The lack of formal
Commission involvement could, in theory, reduce the degree of deference
given by courts to positions taken in no action letters.  As a practical mat-
ter, however, this has not occurred.213  The courts have in fact consistently
deferred to positions taken in no action letters,214 treating “longstand-
ing”215 positions as “persuasive.”216
letter’s statement that the SEC would no longer follow the ‘significant policy impli-
cations’ exception was a rule: it stated generally that the Division staff was making a
sea change and that it was abandoning its former policy regarding proxy inclusion
requirements.”).  Nor is the interpretative rule susceptible to challenge as arbitrary
and capricious. See id. at 14 (“Here, the plaintiffs have an effective alternative to
suing the SEC: They can sue Cracker Barrel, or any other offending company
under Rule 14a–8, to enjoin the board to include their proposal in the proxy
materials.  In that suit, should the company offer the rule espoused in the Cracker
Barrel no-action letter to show compliance, the plaintiffs may counter that the rule
is arbitrary and capricious.  If the plaintiffs prevail in that suit, they would then get
all the relief they now seek from the SEC on their claim of arbitrary and capricious
agency action.  Thus, we dismiss this claim under section 704.”).
211. See id. at 12 (“The no-action letter, however, is an informal response, and
does not amount to an official statement of the SEC’s views.” (citation omitted));
Apache Corp. v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 n.3 (S.D. Tex.
2008) (“The no-action letter, however, is an informal response, and does not
amount to an official statement of the SEC’s views.” (citation omitted)); see also
Missud v. SEC, No. C–12–00161 DMR, 2012 WL 2917769, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 17,
2012) (“Rule 14a-8 ’no action’[sic] letters have the status of a final order if two
requirements are met.  First, the SEC must exercise its discretion to review the
staff’s previous determination.  Second, the resulting determination must ‘impose
an obligation, deny a right or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the
administrative process.’” (citations omitted)).
212. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (to be reviewable, decision must be a “final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject
to judicial review”).
213. Chevron deference, for example, applies in the context of notice-and-
comment.  This type of deference likely does not apply to positions set out in no-
action letters.
214. See, e.g., Apache Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (“The Second Circuit, how-
ever, noted that no-action letters are interpretive because they do not impose or fix
a legal relationship upon any of the parties.  That court concluded that no-action
letters are nonbinding, persuasive authority.  This court agrees.  Therefore, a court
must independently analyze the merits of a dispute even when affirming the SEC’s
conclusion.” (citations omitted)); see also Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile
Emps. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 26 F.Supp.2d 577, 581 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“While
not binding, the SEC opinion letters are entitled to some deference from the
Court.” (citation omitted)).
215. See, e.g., Hall v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 223 F.R.D. 219, 248 (M.D.N.C. 2004)
(“While it is true that this Court need not defer to the SEC staff’s decision not to
recommend enforcement with respect to Tyco International’s decision to exclude
Plaintiff’s shareholder proposal, the Court does note that ‘courts have relied on
the consistency of the SEC staff’s position and reasoning on a given issue, or the
lack of consistency, in determining whether a proposal that was deemed excluda-
ble by the SEC staff can in fact be omitted under Rule [14a-8(i)(7)].’” (citation
omitted)).
216. See, e.g., Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 342
n.11 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Although we disagree with the view that the letter holds any
39
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VI. REDUCING ENCRYPTION AND IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY
The system would benefit from greater transparency and accountabil-
ity.  Positions should be articulated more clearly and input solicited from
interested parties.  The Commission should have a greater degree of overt
involvement in the review and determination of administrative policies
with respect to Rule 14a-8.
Increasing transparency and accountability would allow parties to
have more certainty about the application of the rule and ensure that in-
terpretations coincided rather than conflicted with the terms of the provi-
sion.  Increased certainty would reduce costs.  Shareholders would better
understand the boundaries of the rule when writing proposals and compa-
nies would be less likely to file no-action requests that have little chance of
success.
Increased transparency could most easily occur through an expansion
of the analysis included in no-action letters.  This does not mean that every
letter must contain a fulsome explanation of the decision.  Where, how-
ever, a proposal presents novel facts or could produce a material change
in interpretation, a meaningful explanation should be provided.217  Par-
ties need not be left with encrypted interpretations that can require years
to decipher.
Administrative positions could also be set out more often in legal bul-
letins.  These typically provide more expansive insight.  Reflecting the
views of the staff rather than the Commission, the missives are typically
published at the end of the proxy season.  The bulletins, however, are
used infrequently218 and at least sometimes appear more designed to re-
duce the administrative work load rather than fully explaining encrypted
interpretations.219
Increasing the explanatory narrative in no-action letters and bulletins
would create greater transparency.  Affirmative disclosure of relevant anal-
ysis and positions would also likely result in a more rigorous internal pro-
cess when addressing novel areas.  Aware that policies would be more
clearly stated and therefore subject to comment or criticism, the determi-
persuasive value, we do give the staff’s body of no-action letters ‘careful considera-
tion as “representing the views of persons who are continuously working with the
provisions of the statute [the regulation in our case] involved.”’” (quoting Dona-
ghue v. Accenture Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 8329, 2004 WL 1823448, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
16, 2004))); see also Lindner v. Am. Express Co., No. 10 Civ. 2228, 2011 WL
2581745, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2011) (“While SEC no-action letters have no
precedential effect, they may be treated as persuasive.” (citation omitted)).
217. An explanation would have been useful, for example, in the shift in posi-
tion with respect to special meeting proposals. See supra note 199.
218. Ten staff bulletins addressing issues under Rule 14a-8 have been issued
since 2000, most recently in November 2017. See Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 14I (CF) (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/
cfslb14i.htm [https://perma.cc/T43K-ADQA].  They vary significantly in length
and insight.
219. See supra note 21.
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nation would presumably engender a more meaningful review.220  The ap-
proach also could encourage the adoption of clear, bright-line tests in
connection with the application of the rule.221
Such an approach, however, would not, standing alone, ensure an ap-
propriate policy outcome.  The process should also build in a mechanism
for obtaining input in determining administrative interpretations.  This in
fact occurred in connection with the application of Rule 14a-8 to share-
holder access proposals.
Following the initial decision in Whole Foods,222 the shareholder ap-
pealed to the Commission.  The Chair of the SEC ordered the original
letter withdrawn and the issue revisited.223  With the exclusion held in
abeyance, interested parties had an opportunity to provide comments.224
After digesting the various views, the administrative interpretation
changed in a manner that better comported with the language and intent
of the relevant exclusion.225  The approach could be replicated in connec-
tion with the development of other administrative interpretations under
the rule.
Requiring an expanded analysis in no-action letters or staff bulletins
and seeking input more frequently would improve transparency and out-
220. This occurred, for example, with respect to the change in position in the
Whole Foods no-action letter. See infra notes 222–25.
221. Others have suggested something similar. See, e.g., Bevis Longstreth,
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Remarks to the National Association of Manufac-
turers, in Denver, Colo.: The SEC and Shareholder Proposals: Simplification in
Regulation 16 (Dec. 11, 1981), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1981/1211
81longstreth.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G3N-6P4H] (“A return to the simple, bright
line approach should protect the good, discourage the bad, and minimize the ac-
tive, ongoing interference of federal mediators in the relationship between a com-
pany and its shareholders.”).
222. SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 5426272 (Dec. 1, 2014).
223. See Public Statement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement from Chair
White Directing Staff to Review Commission Rule for Excluding Conflicting Proxy
Proposals (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-
conflicting-proxy-proposals.html [https://perma.cc/QTE4-WW8P].
224. See Capital One Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 7326032, at
*1 (Jan. 23, 2015) (special meeting proposal; no-action letter expressed no view on
whether proposal could be excluded under subsection (i)(9)); see also AGL Res.
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 7463987, at *1 (Jan. 23, 2015) (same).
225. See Div. of Corp. Fin, Shareholder Proposals, SEC Staff Legal Bulletin
No. 14H (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14h.htm
[https://perma.cc/6U24-9X6B].  Greater alignment, however, may result in posi-
tions that suggest weaknesses in the language of the rule.  In one no-action letter,
the exclusion applied to a proposal seeking to allow 10% of shareholders to call a
special meeting.  The company proposed to set the percentage at 25%.  As the
letter reasoned: “We concur that a reasonable shareholder could not logically vote
in favor of both.” See Capital One Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2018 WL
446735, at *1 (Feb. 21, 2018).  Shareholders, therefore, were deprived of an oppor-
tunity to choose alternatives.  The no-action letter did require disclosure of the
existence of the alternative and the belief that “a vote in favor of ratification is
tantamount to a vote against a proposal lowering the threshold.” See id.
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comes but leave accountability unaddressed.  Accountability would require
greater direct involvement by the Commission.
The Commission could do so by accepting more appeals and using
the appeals to articulate relevant policies.  The Commission could also is-
sue releases that seek comments on administrative interpretations and use
the input to develop a final standard.226  Positions emanating from, or
approved by, the Commission would be less susceptible to unpredictable
change.  In AFSCME v. AIG,227 the Second Circuit overturned an adminis-
trative interpretation deemed inconsistent with a prior Commission
formulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Greater accountability and transparency would have consequences.
Positions would become clearer, to the detriment of those who benefited
from uncertainty in any given case.  The approach could also become
more abrupt.  Encryption contemplates that the full extent of an adminis-
trative position will only be revealed gradually.  The implementation pro-
cess is therefore more gradual than publicly announced changes.
At the same time, transparency reduces costs.  Shareholders will bet-
ter understand the grounds for exclusion and presumably avoid proposals
that will inevitably be excluded.  Issuers will better understand in advance
the position of the Commission and submit fewer no-action letter requests.
The system will also benefit from increased accountability.  Adminis-
trative positions will be more clearly tied to decision makers.  With respon-
sibility for the outcome better established, the Commission will be more
responsible for the quality of the ultimate decisions and the resulting
consequences.
226. This occurred in connection with the change in interpretation for the
exclusion addressing proposals substantially identical to those submitted by man-
agement that arose out of the position taken in the Whole Foods no-action letter. See
Whole Foods Market, 2014 WL 5426272, at *1.
227. 462 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The SEC has not provided, nor to our
knowledge has it or the Division ever provided, reasons for its changed position
regarding the excludability of proxy access bylaw proposals.  Although the SEC has
substantial discretion to adopt new interpretations of its own regulations in light
of, for example, changes in the capital markets or even simply because of a shift in
the Commission’s regulatory approach, it nevertheless has a duty to explain its
departure from prior norms.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
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APPENDIX A
APPLICATION OF RULE 14A-8(I)(3): 2000–2017228
Year (i)(3) (i)(3) (i)(3) non- (i)(3) exclu- (i)(3) non-
proposals exclusions exclusions sions (“some exclusions
(“some (“unable to con- basis” for exclu- (“unable to con-
basis” for cur” on the sion with the cur” on the
exclusion right to exclude right to cure) right to exclude
without without the with the right to
the right right to cure) cure)
to cure)
2017 27 0 25 0 2
2016 44 4 40 0 0
2015 49 2 46 0 1
2014 67 26 40 0 1
2013 82 25 57 0 0
2012 73 26 47 0 0
2011 40 9 30 0 1
2010 59 11 48 0 0
2009 92 13 79 0 0
2008 69 27 42 0 0
2007 70 20 49 0 1
2006 70 2 66 1 1
2005 86 6 79 0 1
2004 146 14 40 9 83
2003 144 11 19 7 107
2002 168 15 26 4 123
2001 100 14 8 0 78
2000 81 10 26 2 43
228. Analysis of no-action letters is often done on the basis the proxy area,
which approximately runs from July 1 through June 30 of the following year.  This
table, however, collects data on the basis of each calendar year.
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